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COMPUTATIONAL MECHANISM DESIGN
Abstract
Computational mechanism design brings together the concern in microeco-
nomics with decision making in the context of distributed private informa-
tion and self-interest and the concern in computer science with computa-
tional and communication complexity. In constructing mechanisms, with
application to the design of electronic markets and to protocols for au-
tomated negotiation, many new issues arise in resolving tensions between
incentive, computation and communication constraints.
1.1 Introduction
Mechanism design (MD) is a sub-ﬁeld of microeconomics and game the-
ory which considers how to implement good system-wide solutions to prob-
lems that involve multiple self-interested agents, each with private infor-
mation about preferences and capabilities. In recent years mechanism de-
sign has found many applications within computer science and operations
research; e.g., in electronic market design [FGHK02, HKP04], distributed
planning [HG00, BGT03], and in solving many distributed combinatorial
optimization problems [dVV03, CSS06]. MD is becoming increasingly rele-
vant in distributed systems for commerce, computation, and information.
Mechanisms are protocols for decision making in multi-agent systems with
self-interested agents that have private information which, collectively, de-
termines the appropriate decision. It is often useful to conceptualize mech-
anism design as “inverse game theory.” One is starting with a model of
the beliefs and private information of agents, and a normative model that
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asserts that agents will play a Nash equilibrium of game, and designing
the “rules of the game” such that the equilibrium behavior of agents will
generate outcomes with desirable properties.
In computational MD (CMD) much of the focus has been on the design of
mechanisms that are truthful. Truthfulness can be thought of as a statement
about non-manipulability (at least in the absence of collusion): no agent can
do better for itself than by truthfully revealing private information in inter-
acting with the mechanism. Truthfulness extends to indirect mechanisms,
where mechanisms are designed such that agents follow “straightforward” or
“intended” strategies in equilibrium. Common computational goals in CMD
include making sure that the computation required by the protocol in de-
termining the outcome can be eﬃciently implemented, and also minimizing
the amount of information revelation from agents to the mechanism.
The need to simultaneously consider both computational and incentive
issues arises in a number of practical settings. On eBay, where search en-
gines, automated proxy agents, reputation mechanisms and ascending price
auctions combine to form an electronic marketplace. At search engines such
as Google, where automated proxy agents and machine learning techniques
to predict click-through rates combine to determine the adverts that are
co-located with search results. In expressive procurement auctions (e.g.
CombineNet, Emptoris), where suppliers can use volume discounts and ex-
press capacity constraints and buyers can include business rules to inﬂuence
winner determination (see Bichler et al. [CSS06, chapter23]).
Airline authorities such as the FAA in the U.S. have considered using
combinatorial auctions for the allocation of takeoﬀ and landing slots. As
with other mechanisms for real world problems, determining the outcome
of a combinatorial auction can be a hard computational problem, and ex-
pressive and concise languages are important, in this case to allow airlines
to express values for diﬀerent schedules. Markets have been deployed on
sensor networks and computational test-beds to arbitrate resource alloca-
tion amongst competing users with conﬂicting needs [CBA+05]. Auctions
are proposed as methods to coordinate multiagent planning where a joint
plan must be formed in order to best complete shared tasks in a distributed
environment [HG00, BGT03].
Table 1.1 provides a high-level comparison between the classic focus in
computer science and the classic focus in economics, in terms of the model
that is adopted for agents and the main concerns addressed (following Feigen-
baum [FS].) CMD brings together these concerns and resolves tensions be-
tween incentive, computation and communication constraints.
In recent years, CMD has signiﬁcantly broadened the scope of mecha-6 D. C. Parkes
Traditional Computer Science Microeconomics
Agents are cooperative, Agents are
sometimes adversarial self-interested
Main concerns Main concern is
are computation and incentives
communication costs
Table 1.1. Drawing an Analogy between Computer Science and Economics
nism design. For instance, new attention has been given to the problem
of distributed computation, in which the agents (as computational devices)
are used to perform some of the computation in making a decision and
determining payments. Preference elicitation has emerged as a signiﬁcant
challenge in applying mechanisms to resource allocation in complex environ-
ments. Mechanisms have been proposed for dynamic environments, in which
a mechanism must make a sequence of decisions and the agent population
changes with time.
The goal of this chapter is to provide a broad, relatively self-contained,
introduction to mechanism design, and follow this with an introduction to
some of the problems studied in computational mechanism design. Sec-
tion 1.2 introduces the basic model of mechanism design, including the most
important game-theoretic solution concepts and some of the central possi-
bility and impossibility results. Section 1.3 focuses on the computational
complexity of centralized mechanisms, introduces the agenda of algorith-
mic mechanism design, and develops general characterizations for truthful
mechanisms. Section 1.4 considers the problem of preference elicitation, and
presents ascending price auctions and methods from learning theory in the
context of combinational auctions. Section 1.5 introduces the challenges of
distributed implementation, in which part of the computation in determin-
ing the outcome of a mechanism is performed by the agents. Section 1.6
extends mechanism design to dynamic environments, drawing connections
to work on online algorithms and Markov Decision Processes. We conclude
in Section 1.7.
1.1.1 Related Work
See Fudenberg and Tirole [FT91] and Osborne and Rubinstein [OR94] for
useful introductions to game theory. See McAfee and McMillan [MM96],
Klemperer [Kle00], and Krishna [Kri02] for introductions to auction theory.Computational Mechanism Design 7
Milgrom [Mil04] provides a more advanced treatment. Jackson [Jac03] pro-
vides an accessible survey of mechanism design, Mas-Colell et al. [MCWG95]
a text book treatment, and Dasgupta et al. [DHM79] a comprehensive, tech-
nical survey.
The computational mechanism design topics covered in this chapter are
necessarily restricted in scope and biased in selection. Readers are encour-
aged to consult the books on Combinatorial auctions [CSS06], and Algo-
rithmic Game Theory [NRTV07], as well as the Proceedings of the ACM
Conference on Electronic Commerce and the International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems for a more complete view of
work in the area.1 Related work also appears in the main theoretical com-
puter science conferences.
For a sampling of papers in the artiﬁcial intelligence community, con-
sider the important early work of Ephrati and Rosenschein [ER91] and
Rosenschein and Zlotkin [RZ94]. More recent papers include those by Sand-
holm [San96], Monderer and Tennenholtz [MT99], Porter et al. [PRST02],
and Conitzer and Sandholm [CS02b, CS02a]. Numerous papers consider
more specialized topics, for instance combinatorial and sequential auctions [Nis00,
YSM04, LS04b, PU00, HKP04, e.g.]. For work in the theoretical computer
science community, consider the papers of Nisan and Ronen [NR00, NR01],
Lehmann et al. [LOS02] and Feigenbaum et al. [FKSS01].
1.2 Preliminaries
The decision to be made by a mechanism is formalized as the choice of
some alternative from a set of alternatives A = {a,b,...} and agents N =
{1,2,...} with |N| = n. Agent i has private information (its type) θi ∈ Θi,
and a value vi(a;θi) ∈ R for alternative a ∈ A. Often times we will just
write vi(a). Agents are assumed to have quasilinear utility,
ui(a,p) = vi(a;θi) − p, (1.1)
for alternative a at price p.2 We will restrict attention to private value
models so that an agent’s value for an alternative depends only on its own
type.3
1The graduate class, “Topics at the Interface between Computer Science and Economics” at
Harvard University http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/˜parkes/cs286r is also a good place to ﬁnd
papers and other information.
2Quasilinearity implies no budget constraints and risk neutrality, with agents indiﬀerent between
a payment equal to the expected value of a lottery and the lottery itself. See Borgs et al. [BCI+05]
for a recent treatment of budget-constraints and other non-linearities in the utility function.
3Krishna [Kri02] provides an accessible treatment of mechanism design in interdependent value
domains. Interdependent value models can be important, for instance when allocating resources8 D. C. Parkes
θ = (θ1,...,θn)
g(θ) ∈ A
p(θ) ∈ Rn
M =< g,p >
Fig. 1.1. The components of a direct-revelation mechanism.
The primary goal usually adopted in mechanism design can be expressed
in terms of a social choice function, which deﬁnes an alternative to be se-
lected for each possible private type vector θ = (θ1,...,θn). For instance,
one might be interested in implementing the value-maximizing alternative,
i.e. f(θ) = argmaxa∈A
 
i vi(a;θi). Revenue-maximization is another com-
mon goal adopted in mechanism design, especially in auction settings. In an
allocation problem the alternatives represent allocations, and the transfers
represent payments to the auctioneer.
Example 1.1 In an auction for a single-item, the alternatives deﬁne the
possible allocations, i.e. which agent gets the item. Assuming that agent
1 has value v1(a;θ1) = 10 for the alternative a in which it wins, then its
utility for the alternative in which it is allocated the item at price p is
u1(a,p) = v1(a;θ1) − p = 10 − p, and the agent has positive utility as long
as p < 10.
1.2.1 Direct Revelation Mechanisms
We start by introducing the simple but important class of direct revelation
mechanisms. A direct revelation mechanism (DRM), M =<g,p>, is deﬁned
in terms of an outcome rule g : Θ → A and a payment rule p : Θ → Rn,
where Θ = (Θ1 × ... × Θn) denotes the joint type space.4 A mechanism
takes reports θ from agents and selects alternative g(θ) (the “outcome”)
and payment pi(θ) for each agent. (See Figure 1.1). Because agents are
self-interested the reports need not be truthful. A mechanism M deﬁnes a
situation of strategic interdependence, and thus a non-cooperative game.
in a competitive marketplace or when a better estimate of the value of an alternative can be
constructed with information about the types of other agents.
4The outcome rule and payment rule can also be randomized. Randomization is useful in achieving
competitive approximation guarantees in combinatorial auctions [DNS06] and auctions for digital
goods [GH03]. We adopt deterministic rules here for ease of presentation.Computational Mechanism Design 9
The fundamental concept of agent choice in game theory is expressed as
a strategy. A strategy deﬁnes the action an agent will select in all possible
states of the world. For example, if the mechanism is an ascending price
auction then a strategy deﬁnes the bid an agent will submit in response to
all possible prices.
The basic model of agent rationality in game theory is that of an expected-
utility maximizer. An agent will select a strategy that maximizes its ex-
pected utility, given its preferences over alternatives, beliefs about the strate-
gies and types of other agents, and the structure of the game. The central
solution concept is that of a Nash equilibrium, which states that in equilib-
rium every agent will select a utility-maximizing strategy given the strategy
of every other agent. Thus, game theory allows a mechanism designer to
reason about the alternative that will be implemented by a mechanism in
equilibrium.
Mechanism design deﬁnes games of incomplete information because agents
are typically modeled as having uncertainty about the types of other agents.5
When necessary, agents can be modeled as having beliefs about the types
of other agents. In a DRM, strategies take a particularly simple form. A
strategy si : Θi → Θi, deﬁnes a reported type, si(θi), for every possible type
of an agent. All agents simultaneously and privately make a claim about
their type to the mechanism.
The most important solution concepts for DRMs are those of dominant
strategy equilibrium and Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. These both character-
ize particular kinds of Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information game
induced by a mechanism.
In deﬁning these concepts we adopt the following standard short-hand no-
tation. Let s−i = (s1,...,si−1,si+1,...sn) and θ−i = (θ1,...,θi−1,θi+1,...,θn)
denote the strategy proﬁle and type proﬁle without agent i. Given this,
let ui(si,s−i;θi,θ−i) = vi(g(si(θi),s−i(θ−i));θi)−pi(si(θi),s−i(θ−i)), denote
the utility to agent i in the game deﬁned by mechanism M =<g,p> when
agents adopt strategies (si,s−i) and have types (θi,θ−i).
Deﬁnition 1.2 Strategy proﬁle s∗ is a dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE)
in mechanism M =<g,p> when:
ui(s∗
i,s−i;θi,θ−i) ≥ ui(s′
i,s−i;θi,θ−i), ∀i,∀θi,∀s′
i  = s∗
i,∀θ−i,∀s−i (1.2)
In words, strategy s∗
i is a dominant strategy for agent i if the agent max-
5In contrast, the study of Nash implementation theory (as opposed to mechanism design theory)
considers agents that are informed about each others’ types and a center (or designer) that is
uninformed. See Jackson [Jac01] for a useful survey of the literature on implementation theory.10 D. C. Parkes
imizes its utility with this strategy for all types θi, whatever the strategies
(and types) of other agents.
Example 1.3 In a sealed-bid second-price (Vickrey auction), a single item
is sold to the highest bidder for the second-highest price. Let type θi denote
the value of agent i for the item. Then, bidding strategy:
si(θi) = θi (1.3)
is a dominant strategy for agent i. To see this, consider some arbitrary θ−i
and s′
−i and ﬁx θi. Agent i’s utility for report si(θi) = ˆ θi is:
ui(si,s′
−i;θi,θ−i) =
 
θi − maxj =is′
j(θj) , if ˆ θi > maxj =i s′
j(θj)
0 otherwise
Agent i maximizes its utility by reporting ˆ θi > maxj =i s′
j(θj) (so that
it wins) if and only if θi > maxj =i s′
j(θj), which it achieves with strategy
si(θi) = ˆ θi = θi. This is a dominant bidding strategy because it holds for
any s′
i, any θ−i and any θi.
Recognize that the fundamental reason for truthfulness in the Vickrey
auction is that every agent faces a price that is independent of its report
(i.e. maxj =is′
j(θj)) and wins the item at that price if its reported value is
greater than the price. We will revisit this idea of agent-independent prices
in the general MD setting in Section 1.3.3.
Sometimes a mechanism with more desirable properties can be constructed
by relaxing the solution concept to a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Assume that
types are distributed according to probability distribution function Pr(θ).
Deﬁnition 1.4 Strategy proﬁle s∗ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) in
mechanism M =<g,p> when:
Eθ−i
 
ui(s∗
i,s∗
−i;θi,θ−i)
 
≥Eθ−i
 
ui(s′
i,s∗
−i;θi,θ−i)
 
, ∀i,∀θi,∀s′
i  = s∗
i,
(1.4)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the conditional distribution
θ−i sampled from conditional distribution, Pr(θ−i|θi), given type θi.
In a BNE, every agent is assumed to share a common prior about the
distribution of agent types. Moreover, both this prior belief and the ratio-
nality of agents must be common knowledge. In equilibrium, each agent
plays a strategy that maximizes its expected utility given the distribution
over types of other agents.Computational Mechanism Design 11
Example 1.5 In a sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction, a single item is sold to the
highest bidder for its bid price. Let type θi denote the value of agent i for
the item. Suppose that values are i.i.d. θi sampled uniformly on [0,1]. Then,
bidding strategy
si(θi) =
 
n − 1
n
 
θi
is the unique symmetric BNE.6
Deﬁnition 1.6 Mechanism M =<g,p> implements social choice function
f : Θ → A in DSE (or BNE) if f(θ) = g(s∗(θ)) for some DSE (or BNE)
strategy proﬁle s∗, for all types θ.
Mechanisms that implement a social choice function in a DSE are more
robust than those which implement a social choice function only in a BNE
because no assumptions are made about the knowledge that agents have
about the types or rationality of other agents. Mechanisms with DSE are
also preferred computationally because they free agents of the need to reason
about the strategies of other agents.
An important subclass of DRMs are the incentive-compatible DRMs. In
an incentive-compatible (IC) mechanism it is an equilibrium for every agent
to report its true type.
Deﬁnition 1.7 Mechanism M =< g,p > is dominant-strategy incentive-
compatible (DSIC) for type space Θ if strategy s∗(θi) = θi is a dominant
strategy equilibrium.
DSIC mechanisms are often called strategy-proof or truthful because
they are non-manipulable in the sense that an agent can do no better than
simply reporting its true type.
Deﬁnition 1.8 Mechanism M =<g,p> is Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible
(BNIC) for type space Θ if strategy s∗(θi) = θi is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
The social choice function implemented by an IC mechanism is deﬁned by
the outcome rule g; an IC mechanism M =<g,p> is said to be a dominant-
strategy (or Bayes-Nash) implementation of social choice function g.
By the revelation principle [Gib73] it is without loss of generality to focus
on the space of incentive-compatible mechanisms. The revelation principle
states that any mechanism M′ can be transformed into an equivalent IC
6See the Appendix in Klemperer [Kle00] for a proof of this result via the revenue equivalence
theorem and Krishna [Kri02] for a proof from ﬁrst principles.12 D. C. Parkes
and DRM mechanism M that implements the same social choice function.
See Mas-Colell et al. [MCWG95] for a text book treatment. The revelation
principle holds for both dominant-strategy and Bayes-Nash equilibrium.7
Note that the revelation principle does not say that truth-revelation is
“easy” to achieve, but simply that if some mechanism solves a problem in
equilibrium then it can also be solved in a truth-revealing equilibrium of
another mechanism. It is achieving a desired outcome in an equilibrium
that is diﬃcult, not making that equilibrium a truth-revealing equilibrium.
The revelation principle is useful in focusing goals and delineating what
is and is not possible in MD (and thus also delineating impossibility results
of relevance in computational MD). For instance, if there is no BNIC imple-
mentation of a social choice function with a set of desired properties then no
mechanism (however complex) can succeed in implementing a social choice
function with these properties.
Note, though, that the revelation principle puts computational consid-
erations to one side. The revelation principle should not be construed as
stating that direct mechanisms are the only mechanisms of practical rele-
vance. On the contrary, indirect mechanisms can often enable more eﬃcient
preference elicitation and also distribute computation to agents.8 Moreover,
the possibility results of MD ignore computational constraints and although
possible from the perspective of incentive constraints, the computational
complexity of a problem may also preclude implementation. We will con-
sider the computational requirements placed on the center in Section 1.3
and the computational requirements placed on agents, for instance through
the cost of preference elicitation, in Section 1.4.
1.2.2 Indirect Mechanisms
Indirect mechanisms deﬁne games with a more complicated information
structure than direct mechanisms. Indirect mechanisms, which include
ascending-price auctions and distributed mechanisms, are of great interest
in many computational domains.
Indirect mechanisms diﬀer from DRMs in two ways. First, the message
7The intuition behind the revelation principle is a reduction argument, and goes as follows. Mech-
anism M will simulate the entire system (the equilibrium bidding strategies s∗ of agents and the
outcome rule) of mechanism M′, given reports ˆ θ from agents. Thus, if strategy s∗ is an equilib-
rium in mechanism M′ then an agent should report its true type ˆ θi = θi in mechanism M so that
the mechanism simulates its correct equilibrium strategy. For a BNE, this simulation argument
requires that the mechanism designer has access to the distribution over agent types.
8Conitzer and Sandholm [CS04] also provide an interesting construction that shows that compu-
tational complexity can be used to overcome some impossibility results, by shifting the complexity
to agents.Computational Mechanism Design 13
space in an indirect mechanism does not correspond with reports about an
agent’s type. For instance, in an ascending-price auction the message space
may instead allow an agent to report a bundle of items that maximizes its
utility at the current prices, which provides indirect and partial information
about an agent’s type. Second, agents can typically send multiple messages
while participating in a mechanism and can condition the messages that
they send on information provided by the mechanism.
A strategy si(θi) ∈ Σi in an indirect mechanism deﬁnes the message(s)
that an agent will send to the mechanism for all types θi and all possible
information states. An indirect mechanism, M =<Σ,g,p>, deﬁnes a space
of feasible joint strategies Σ = Σ1×...×Σn and an outcome rule, g : Σ → A,
and payment rule p : Σ → Rn. An information state delineates a possible
state of the indirect mechanism, and a fully speciﬁed strategy should deﬁne
a message to send for all possible information states.
Example 1.9 Consider a single-item ascending-price auction, in which type
θi denotes the value of agent i for the item. In each round an agent can bid or
stop. Once an agent stops it cannot bid in a later round. The price increases
by some bid increment ǫ > 0 while two or more agents bid. The winner is
the last agent still bidding, and pays the ﬁnal price. The information state
pt in round t deﬁnes the current price pt ≥ 0. A strategy deﬁnes the bid,
si(p,θi), that an agent will place in every state p, and for every type θi. The
straightforward bidding strategy,
s∗
i(p,θi) =
 
bid , if p ≤ θi
stop , otherwise
is a DSE. All strategies are characterized by a threshold value, ˆ θi, such that
the agent will stop for prices above this value. (This is because the auction
constrains an agent to stop for all subsequent rounds to its ﬁrst stop.) Fix
threshold values ˆ θ−i. The auction is now strategically equivalent for agent
i to a second-price auction in which the highest bid from another agent is
ǫ⌈
maxj =i ˆ θj
ǫ ⌉, and s∗
i is agent i’s dominant strategy. Note that it is without
loss of generality to ﬁx ˆ θ−i because the threshold values selected by other
agents are conditionally independent of agent i’s strategy, when conditioned
on the case that agent i wins.
A more typical solution concept adopted in the analysis of indirect mech-14 D. C. Parkes
anisms is that of an ex post Nash equilibrium.9 This is a concept of inter-
mediate strength, in between that of DSE and BNE.
Deﬁnition 1.10 Strategy proﬁle s∗ is an ex post Nash equilibrium (ex post
NE) in mechanism M =<Σ,g,p> when:
ui(s∗
i,s∗
−i;θi,θ−i) ≥ ui(s′
i,s∗
−i;θi,θ−i), ∀i,∀θi,∀s′
i  = s∗
i,∀θ−i (1.5)
In words, strategy s∗ is an ex post NE if no agent can improve its utility by
deviating, whatever the type of other agents, as long as the other agents are
rational and play the equilibrium strategy. It is instructive to compare the
deﬁnition of ex post Nash equilibrium with the deﬁnition of BNE (Eq. 1.4);
an ex post NE is also a BNE, it is a BNE for any distribution on types. In
DRMs, an ex post NE is equivalent to a DSE,10 but this need not be the
case in indirect mechanisms. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1.11 Consider a single-item ascending-price auction with jump
bids. Again, type θi denotes agent i’s value for the item. Bids are associated
with a bid price. In each round, t, the auctioneer announces an ask price,
pt, which is ǫ > 0 above the highest bid received so far from an agent. Any
agent can bid in any round, as the long as the bid is at some price at or
above pt. The provisional winner is the agent with the current highest bid
(breaking ties at random). The auction terminates when no agent bids at
the current price, and the item is then sold to the provisional winner at its
ﬁnal bid price. The information state (pt,xt) deﬁnes the current ask price
pt and xt ∈ {1,...,n} to indicate the provisional winner. A straightforward
bidding strategy is:
s∗
i(p,x,θi) =
 
p , if p ≤ θi and x  = i
no bid , otherwise
This is an ex post NE but not a DSE. To see that it is an ex post NE, ﬁx
straightforward strategies s∗
−i by agents other than i. Each agent’s strategy
is completely characterized by a threshold value, that of its own value for the
item. The analysis then follows essentially as in the previous example. On
the other hand, straightforward bidding is not a DSE. To see this suppose
there are two agents and agent 1’s value is 20, agent 2’s value is 15, the bid
9Ex post IC was discussed as “uniform incentive compatibility” by Holmstr¨ om and Myer-
son [HM83]. See also Jehiel and Moldovanu [JM01] and Bergemann and Morris [BM07].
10This equivalence is true in private value but not interdependent value models where an agent’s
best-response depends on whether other agents will report their true types and thus allow correct
conditioning of value on the types of other agents. See Krishna [Kri02].Computational Mechanism Design 15
increment ǫ = 1, and agent 2 follows the following bidding strategy:
s2(p,x,θ2) =



p , if p ≤ θ2 and x  = 2 and p  = 10
10000 , if p = 10
no bid , otherwise
This is not a rational bidding strategy for agent 2, but nevertheless a feasible
strategy given the rules of the auction. If agent 1 bids straightforwardly the
price will reach 10, triggering agent 2’s “crazy” bid of 10000 and agent 1
will lose. If agent 1 bids a jump bid of 16 from the start then it will win for
16. Thus, this response to the speciﬁc “crazy” strategy is better than the
straightforward strategy.
This example illustrates the role of ex post NE in the design of indirect
mechanisms: the presence of multiple information states allows one agent to
condition its messages (“reports”) on the messages of another agent, thus
leading to richer strategic interactions.
The following limitation should be kept in mind in designing indirect
mechanisms with ex post NE:
Theorem 1.12 Any social choice function f(θ) that is implementable in
an ex post NE of an indirect mechanism is implementable in the dominant
strategy equilibrium of a truthful DRM.
This is an immediate consequence of the arguments that underlie the
revelation principle.11 Thus, only dominant-strategy implementable social
choice functions can be implemented in the ex post Nash equilibrium of an
indirect mechanism.
Before continuing, we make some brief comments about Bayes-Nash equi-
librium in the context of indirect mechanisms. Great care is required in this
analysis because one must allow for the possibility that agents can usefully
update their beliefs about the types of other agents as they interact with the
mechanism and observe information states. The most convenient solution
concept is a reﬁnement called perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which
agents use Bayes rule to update their belief states along the equilibrium
path, and are required to follow an equilibrium strategy from all informa-
tion states. In practice, this gets diﬃcult because one must also deﬁne belief
updates oﬀ the equilibrium path when probability zero events occur. See
11In simulating the ex post NE of the indirect mechanism M′ when constructing the corresponding
IC and DRM mechanism M one “locks down” the strategies of all agents and thus ensures that
all (simulated) agents will follow the ex post NE strategy of the indirect mechanism, albeit for
some (perhaps untruthful) reported type.16 D. C. Parkes
Osborne and Rubinstein [OR94] and Fudenberg and Tirole [FT91] for a
detailed discussion.
1.2.3 Possibility Results
Given the framework of MD one can ask what properties of social choice
functions can be implemented in the equilibrium of a mechanism, given the
constraints implied by agents’ private information and self-interest. MD
provides a number of interesting possibility and impossibility results. These
are important to understand in the context of computational MD, which
will layer on top additional constraints, i.e. those related to computational
and communication considerations.12
Here are some possible desiderata for the social choice functions and pay-
ments implemented in the equilibrium of a mechanism M=<g,p>:
(EFF) The outcome is (ex post) eﬃcient, i.e. g(s∗(θ)) ∈
argmaxa∈A
 
i vi(a;θi), for all θ and equilibrium s∗.
(WBB) The payments are (ex post) weak budget balanced, i.e.  
i pi(s∗(θ)) ≥ 0 for all θ and equilibrium s∗.
(IR) The outcome and payments satisfy (ex post) individual rationality,
i.e. vi(g(s∗(θ));θi)−pi(s∗(θ)) ≥ 0 for all i, all θ, and equilibrium s∗.
Eﬃciency (EFF) is termed allocative eﬃciency when applied in a re-
source allocation domain. Budget balance (WBB) can be relaxed to ex
ante WBB when it is only required to holds in expectation given a distribu-
tion on agent types, i.e. Eθ [
 
i pi(s∗(θ))] ≥ 0, and can be strengthened to
strong budget balance (BB) when payments must exactly balance to zero,
i.e.
 
i pi(s∗(θ)) = 0.
Individual-rationality (IR) corresponds to a participation constraint be-
cause it asserts that all agents receive non-negative utility from partic-
ipating in the mechanism. IR can be relaxed to interim IR, meaning
non-negative expected utility for any type θi given the distribution across
other types, i.e. Eθ−i
 
vi(g(s∗
i(θi),s∗
−i(θ−i));θi) − pi(s∗
i(θi),s∗
−i(θ−i))
 
≥
0, and can be further relaxed to ex ante IR, where the expec-
tation is also taken with respect to an agent’s own type, i.e.
EθiEθ−i
 
vi(g(s∗
i(θi),s∗
−i(θ−i));θi) − pi(s∗
i(θi),s∗
−i(θ−i))
 
≥ 0. The appropri-
ate variation of IR depends on the commitment power of the mechanism.
12Computational complexity can sometimes be used to reverse negative results by designing pro-
tocols in which desirable strategies are computable (or given) but undesirable strategies are hard
to compute. See Conitzer and Sandholm [CS04] and Sanghvi and Parkes [SP04a] for a discussion.Computational Mechanism Design 17
Name Utility Solution Possible Valuation
concept environment
Groves QL DSE EFF & (IR or WBB) general
VCG QL DSE EFF, IR & WBB no positive externalities
d’AGVA QL BNE EFF, BB & ex ante IR general
Myerson QL BNE OPT, WBB & IR single-item
(DSE) (symmetric priors)
Table 1.2. Mechanism Design Possibility Results.
However, as a rule of thumb, ex ante IR is hard to justify and ex post IR is
the usual standard that is adopted.13
An additional desiderata for a mechanism in some environments is to max-
imize the expected utility of a particular agent, most commonly formulated
as that of maximizing the expected revenue of the seller in an auction:
(OPT) Mechanism M is revenue optimal if the expected revenue,
Eθ[
 
i pi(s∗(θ))], is maximal across all possible mechanisms, where
s∗ is an equilibrium strategy.
Table 1.2 summarizes four of the most well known possibility results.14
The possibility results are delineated by the form of the agent utility function
(i.e. quasilinear (QL) in all of these cases), the equilibrium solution concept,
and the “valuation environment,” which describes the assumptions made
about the valuation functions of agents. General value environments allow
arbitrary (private) values on alternatives. No positive externalities requires
that each agent’s presence in the economy has a negative eﬀect on the value
of other agents in the eﬃcient solution. We return to this requirement below.
Single item environments are those for which agents have a private value for
a single item to be allocated.
The celebrated Groves [Gro73] family of mechanisms, which are truthful
DRMs (i.e. DSIC), are deﬁned with outcome rule:
g(θ) = argmax
a∈A
 
i
vi(a;θi) (1.6)
13If a mechanism can make an agent commit before it even learns its own type then ex ante IR can
be reasonable. This is possible, for instance, if a population of agents (such as the U.S. Congress)
chooses a mechanism for decision making some time ahead of when their individual preferences
are realized. If a mechanism can make an agent commit after it learns its own type but before
learning the outcome of the mechanism then interim IR is reasonable.
14Dasgupta et al. [DHM79], Jackson [Jac03] and Mas-Colell et al. [MCWG95] provide additional
examples.18 D. C. Parkes
and payment rule:
pi(θ) = hi(θ−i) −
 
j =i
vj(g(θ);θj) (1.7)
where hi : Θ−i → R is an arbitrary function on the reports of all agents
except i. This freedom in selecting hi leads to the description of a “fam-
ily” of mechanisms. Diﬀerent choices make diﬀerent tradeoﬀs between the
desiderata of WBB and IR.
A Groves mechanism selects an alternative that maximizes the reported
values of all agents and then makes a payment to each equal to the total
reported value to the other agents for the decision, with an agent also paying
the mechanism some amount that is independent of its own report.
To see that Groves mechanisms are strategy-proof, consider an agent with
utility ui(a,p) = vi(a;θi) − p for alternative a at price p ∈ R. Now, ﬁxing
the reports from other agents, ˆ θ−i, the utility to agent i given report, ˆ θi, is:
πi(ˆ θi) =vi(g(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i);θi) +
 
j =i
vj(g(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i); ˆ θj) − hi(ˆ θ−i) (1.8)
Ignore the ﬁnal term, which is independent of the agent’s report.15 Then,
the only eﬀect that agent i’s report has on its utility in Eq. (1.8) is via
the choice by the center of alternative a∗ = g(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i). Agent i max-
imizes Eq. (1.8) by reporting ˆ θi = θi so that in choosing a∗ to solve
argmaxa
 
i vi(a; ˆ θi) the center will maximize Eq. (1.8), i.e. choose an al-
ternative to maximize agent i’s true value and the total reported values of
the other agents.
Thus, the payment term in a Groves mechanism is deﬁned to align the
incentives of every agent with that of maximizing the total value to all
agents. This simple idea provides truthfulness. Groves mechanisms are
EFF for all environments by deﬁnition of outcome rule g and from their
DSIC property.
The ﬁrst term in the Groves payment rule can be used to achieve IR while
also maximizing the total payments made to the center. This corresponds
to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves [Cla71, Gro73, Vic61] mechanism.
Deﬁnition 1.13 The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is a Groves
mechanism with:
hi(θ−i) =
 
j =i
vj(g(θ−i);θj), (1.9)
15Note that it does not even depend on the agent’s report via the strategies of other agents since
they cannot condition on agent i’s report in a DRM.Computational Mechanism Design 19
where g(θ−i) = argmaxa∈A
 
j =ivj(a;θj), i.e. an eﬃcient alternative with-
out agent i.
The total payment by agent i in the VCG mechanism is the marginal
negative eﬀect that agent i has on the total value to the other agents by its
presence.
Example 1.14 The special case of VCG mechanism for the allocation of a
single item is the familiar second-price sealed-bid auction, or Vickrey [Vic61]
auction. In this case, with bids ˆ θ1 and ˆ θ2 to denote the ﬁrst- and second-
highest bids, the item is sold to the agent with the highest bid (agent 1),
for a price computed as p1(ˆ θ) =
 
j =1 vj(g(ˆ θ−1); ˆ θj) −
 
j =1 vj(g(ˆ θ); ˆ θj) =
ˆ θ2−0 = ˆ θ2, i.e. the second-highest bid. Notice that we have IR here because
ˆ θ2 ≤ ˆ θ1 = θ1 in equilibrium and WBB because ˆ θ2 ≥ 0 and all other payments
are zero.
Let V (N) = maxa∈A
 
i∈N vi(a;θi), i.e. the total value from the eﬃcient
choice. Simple algebraic manipulation establishes that the VCG mechanism
satisﬁes IR whenever the environment satisﬁes the following non-negative
marginal product condition:
V (N) ≥ V (N \ i), (1.10)
for all types θ and all agents i. Introducing an agent should never reduce
the total value available from the maximal alternative. This is reasonable,
holding in market environments such as exchanges because all trades remain
feasible when introducing additional agents.16
The VCG mechanism also satisﬁes WBB when each agent’s payment is
non-negative, for which we need the following no positive externalities con-
dition:
 
j =i
vj(g(ˆ θ−i); ˆ θj) ≥
 
j =i
vj(g(ˆ θ); ˆ θj) (1.11)
Removing agent i should allow the remaining agents to achieve at least
as much value from the maximal alternative as they achieve when agent i is
present. This holds, for instance, in an auction setting with a seller with no
intrinsic value for the goods, but not in an exchange because agent i could
be a seller and facilitate new trades and thus have a positive externality
on the other agents. The VCG mechanism also satisﬁes WBB in a public
16This also holds in public choice problems, when introducing a new agent cannot change the
range of public projects that can be implemented and no agent has negative value for any public
project (in relation to no choice being made). It may not hold in environments with physical
congestion, for instance when introducing an additional robot can block the paths of all robots.20 D. C. Parkes
project choice problem because the set of choices available is static however
many agents are in the system.
The VCG mechanism is especially useful when EFF is a primary goal but
revenue optimality a secondary goal.
Theorem 1.15 [KP00] The VCG mechanism maximizes the expected rev-
enue (and thus comes the closest to satisfying BB) amongst all EFF, IR and
BNIC mechanisms.
Other than having practical importance, for instance to the designer of
an eﬃcient marketplace that nevertheless wishes to drive as much revenue
as possible to sellers, this result is also useful in establishing some of the
central impossibility results in MD. See Krishna and Perry [KP00] for an
extended discussion.
In many environments the fact that the VCG mechanism runs at a sur-
plus to the center may be undesirable. Consider, for instance, a group of
friends using a Vickrey auction to decide who should use a shared car for
the evening. They would rather not “burn” the proceeds of the auction
(or, for the sake of argument, give the proceeds to charity), but cannot
blindly return the collected payment to the participants without compro-
mising truthfulness. In addressing this loss of utility by the participants,
one approach is to sacriﬁce some eﬃciency in return for strong BB [Fal04].
Another approach is to leverage structure in agent valuations and redis-
tribute payments back to agents in a way that maintains truthfulness and
full eﬃciency (but necessarily without achieving strict BB) [Cav06, GC07].
Continuing, we make some brief remarks about the d’AGVA [Arr79, dG79]
mechanism, often referred to as the expected externality mechanism (see
also Mas-Colell et al. [MCWG95]) because of its connection with the VCG
mechanism.
The d’AGVA mechanism is interesting because it achieves EFF and strong
ex post (strong) BB by relaxing ex post IR to ex ante IR and DSIC to BNIC.
The outcome rule is the same as for the Groves mechanism but d’AGVA is
not a Groves mechanism and the payment rule is instead deﬁned as:
pi(θ) =

 1
n − 1
 
 
j =i
SW−j(θj)

 − SW−i(θi), (1.12)
where
SW−i(θi) = Eθ−i


 
j =i
vj(g(θi,θ−i);θj)

 (1.13)Computational Mechanism Design 21
Note that SW−i(θi) only depends on the report of agent i and is inde-
pendent of the reports of all agents j  = i. This term is the expected total
value, in equilibrium, for agents j  = i when agent i announces type ˆ θi. For
this reason, the d’AGVA mechanism is BNIC instead of DSIC, with the
incentive-compatibility requiring that the other agents bid truthfully and
according to the distribution that deﬁnes the payment. In Groves, this term
would be the actual value to the rest of the agents. Similarly, d’AGVA is ex
ante IR (in environments such as exchanges, that satisfy positive marginal
product), which is a critical weakness in many domains.17
The possibility results available for revenue optimality are less general
but extremely interesting. While the VCG mechanism is revenue optimal
across all EFF and IR mechanisms, it is typically possible to achieve better
(expected) revenue by sacriﬁcing some eﬃciency. In seminal work, Myer-
son [Mye81] constructs a revenue optimal single-item auction. See Klem-
perer [Kle00] for a more recent treatment. For agents with i.i.d. types (i.e.
symmetric priors), the optimal auction is equivalent to a Vickrey auction
with a reserve price. The item is sold to the highest bidder if the bid price
is greater than the reserve price, and sold at the reserve price or second-
highest bid, whichever is greater. By setting a reserve price the auction
will sometimes sell the item for more than the Vickrey price, however the
auction will sometimes forfeit a sale and is generally ineﬃcient.
More generally, the optimal auction allocates the item with the highest
“virtual valuation.” The virtual valuation is determined as an adjustment
from the reported value of an agent and depends on the prior distribution
for that agent’s value [Mye81]. In this case the optimal auction is Bayes-
Nash IC, such an auction an auction can achieve more revenue than a DSIC
mechanism. Revenue-optimal auctions are not known for general valuation
environments, such as combinatorial auctions in which bidders want to buy
bundles of items and have complements (“I only want A if I also get B”)
and substitutes (“I only want A or B”) values. See [JtVM07, Led07, ¨ U06,
IK06, MV04] for recent progress in restricted settings, and Likhodedov and
Sandholm [LS04b, LS05, Voh07, CHK07] for a computational approach.
17The ﬁrst term in Eq. (1.12), as in Groves mechanisms, is agent independent. Here, it represents
the average (over agents j except i) of the estimated total “without j” value given report θj and
the distribution on types. Taken together, this gives strong ex post (strong) BB, with each agent
except i making a payment back to the mechanism equal to a 1/(n − 1) share of the payment
made by the mechanism to agent i.22 D. C. Parkes
1.2.4 Impossibility Results
The impossibility results in MD appeal to the revelation principle and work
with incentive-compatibility conditions to establish combinations of desider-
ata that cannot be achieved in any mechanism. These negative results arise
entirely as a result of the private information in multi-agent systems; this
coupled with agent self-interest has a cost in terms of properties that can
be achieved.
Table 1.3 describes some important impossibility results. Results are de-
lineated by agent utility (e.g. unrestricted utilities, or quasilinear (QL)),
the equilibrium solution concept, and by any structure allowed in the value
environment. The “Impossible” column lists the combinations of desirable
mechanism properties that cannot be achieved in each case. Impossibility
for restricted preferences and structured environments implies impossibility
for more general settings; similarly, impossibility for weak solution concepts
such as BNE imply impossibility for stronger solution concepts such as DSE.
The Gibbard [Gib73] and Satterthwaite‘[Sat75] impossibility theorem
(GibSat) states that for unrestricted preferences and at least 3 alternatives
only dictatorial social choice functions can be implemented in DSE. See Mas-
Colell et al. [MCWG95] for a proof. A mechanism is dictatorial if there is
some agent i, deﬁned independently of agent strategies s (although perhaps
at random), that always receives one of its most-preferred alternatives (from
the alternatives in the range of the outcome rule given the strategies of the
other agents.) Although Pareto eﬃcient, a dictatorial social choice func-
tion is undesirable for other reasons since it does a poor job of aggregating
preference information.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility result at ﬁrst appears very neg-
ative. However the assumption of unrestricted preferences is a strong one.
Most real environments will impose some structure. For instance, in alloca-
tion problems it is common to assume free disposal (weakly-increasing value
for allocations of more goods) and no-externalities (indiﬀerence to the dis-
tribution of goods across other agents). In a voting setting, positive results
are available again when values are “single-peaked” (e.g. candidates fall on
a spectrum from the political left to the political right) [Jac03].
The Hurwicz [Hur75] and Myerson-Satterthwaite [MS83] impossibility re-
sults are signiﬁcant, then, because they hold even with quasi-linear utility.
Hurwicz (see Groves and Ledyard [GL77b] for a discussion) precludes EFF
and (strong) BB mechanisms in DSE. The result holds in a simple exchange
environment, for instance in which a single unit of a resource is to be allo-
cated amongst a group of agents. Myerson-Satterthwaite further strengthensComputational Mechanism Design 23
Name Utility Solution Impossible Valuation
concept environment
GibSat unrestricted DSE Non-Dictatorial ≥ 3 alternatives
Hurwicz QL DSE EFF & BB simple-exchange
MyerSat QL BNE EFF, WBB simple-exchange
& interim IR
Roberts QL DSE non linear aﬃne no structure
Holmstr¨ om QL DSE EFF & non-Groves smoothly-connected
LMN QL DSE non linear aﬃne & IIA order-based
Table 1.3. Mechanism Design Impossibility Results.
the result by establishing that EFF and (weak) BB (and thus also strong
BB) is impossible even with BNIC, if one also requires interim (and thus
also ex post) IR.18 An immediate consequence of these results is that we
can only hope to achieve at most two of EFF, IR and WBB in many market
settings.19
Kevin Roberts [Rob79] showed, for unrestricted valuations but quasi-
linear utilities, that the only social choice functions that can be implemented
in a dominant strategy equilibrium are the aﬃne maximizers,
f(θ) = argmax
a∈A
 
i
αivi(a;θi) + γ(a), (1.14)
for αi ∈ R≥0 and γ(a) ∈ R. The aﬃne maximizers contain the EFF social
choice function, which is an aﬃne maximizer for which αi = 1 for all i ∈ N
and γ(a) = 0 for all a ∈ A.
Groves mechanisms easily generalize to implement linear-aﬃne maximiz-
ers, and so it would seem from Roberts’ result that Groves mechanisms are
the only DSIC mechanisms available with quasilinear preferences. Not so!
Roberts’ result crucially relies on the assumption that valuations are unre-
stricted. In fact, many domains impose considerable structure on agent val-
uations, for example with free disposal and no-externalities. To paraphrase
Lavi-Mu’alem-Nisan [LMN03] (LMN), “the assumption of unrestricted val-
uations is not without restriction.” LMN extend Roberts to hold in value
environments that can be described as order-based domains. This provides
additional structure and includes, for example, the domain of combinato-
18The centrality of the Groves mechanisms can be used to establish the Myerson-Satterthwaite
impossibility result; see Krishna and Perry [KP00].
19See Babaioﬀ and Walsh [BW05] for a recent discussion of mechanisms for two-sided markets.24 D. C. Parkes
rial auctions.20 LMN also requires independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA)21 and two other technical conditions.
In fact, Holmstr¨ om [Hol79] (see also Green and Laﬀont [GL77a]) shows
that Groves mechanisms are the only available DSIC mechanisms when EFF
is required and when the valuation environment is smoothly connected.22
We defer to Holmstr¨ om for the technical deﬁnition of a smoothly connected
domain. It suﬃces for our purposes to note that the primary example of
a smoothly connected domain is a convex domain. Valuation domain Θi
is convex if for any θi,θ′
i ∈ Θi, and corresponding valuations vi(a;θi) and
vi(a;θ′
i), then type θ′′
i ∈ Θi such that
vi(a;θ′′
i = λvi(a;θi) + (1 − λ)vi(a;θ′
i), (1.15)
for all λ ∈ [0,1]. This should not be confused with a statement that an
agent’s valuation function is convex. This is a property on the domain of
valuations, not on the valuations themselves.
Order-based domains are convex, and thus this characterization result en-
compasses CAs and multi-unit auctions, as well as other domains outlined
in Saks and Yu [SY05]. Single-minded combinatorial auctions (CAs)23 pro-
vide a domain that is smoothly-connected but not convex [CP05], and thus
Holmstr¨ om’s result is also relevant here.
Remark: It is instructive to compare the possibility and impossibility re-
sults and understand the tradeoﬀs that are made. For instance, one can see
that BNIC is sometimes more useful than DSIC by contrasting the d’AGVA
positive result with the Green-Laﬀont impossibility result.
1.2.5 Exact Characterizations
In the light of the many possibility and impossibility results, it is also in-
teresting to note the kinds of exact characterizations that are available for
implementation in a dominant-strategy equilibrium. We will brieﬂy sum-
marize some of what is known in this regard. All of what follows is for
quasilinear preferences.
20An order-based valuation domain is one in which ordinal constraints on agent valuations can be
used to characterize the domain of types. For example, free disposal says that any alternative a
in which agent i gets more goods than some alternative b has more value to agent i.
21A social choice function satisﬁes IIA if for any θ,θ′ ∈ Θ, if f(θ) = a and f(θ′) = b  = a there
exists an agent i such that vi(a;θi) − vi(b;θi)  = vi(a; θ′
i) − vi(b;θ′
i).
22Holmstr¨ om’s result is incomparable with that of Roberts. Holmstr¨ om is imposing the require-
ment of EFF while working with a more general set of valuations.
23In a single-minded CA each agent has a value for some particular bundle of items, with both
this value and the bundle in which it is “single-mindedly” interested, private to the agent.Computational Mechanism Design 25
Unrestricted Valuation Domains From Roberts [Rob79], the only so-
cial choice functions that can be implemented in DSE are aﬃne maximizers.
Moreover, we know that any aﬃne maximizer can be implemented by a
simple modiﬁcation to the Groves mechanism. Therefore, with this (restric-
tive) assumption of an unrestricted valuation domain the aﬃne maximizers
provide an exact characterization of the social choice functions that can be
truthfully implemented.
Convex Valuation Domains Saks and Yu [SY05] establish that the
property of weak monotonicity (W-MON) (see also Bikhchandani et
al. [BCL+06]) is an exact characterization of the truthful social choice func-
tions when the valuation domain is convex.
Deﬁnition 1.16 A social choice function f satisﬁes W-MON if whenever
f(θi,θ−i) = a, and f(θ′
i,θ−i) = b then vi(b;θ′
i)−vi(a;θ′
i) ≥ vi(b;θi)−vi(a;θi).
If the alternative changes from a to b for a change in agent i’s type then
alternative b should not be less preferred relative to a. It is straightforward
to show that W-MON is always necessary for a social choice function to
be truthfully implementable, irrespective of the valuation domain.24 The
contribution of Saks and Yu [SY05] is to show that W-MON is suﬃcient for
truthfulness in a convex domain. As noted above, this domain subsumes
the order-based preference domain [LMN03] and includes many practical
economic environments, including CAs, multi-unit auctions, and auctions
with marginal-decreasing values.
Single-Minded Valuation Domains A valuation domain is single-
minded if agents have single-minded valuations. If an agent has a single-
minded valuation, then its type, θi = (Li,wi) ∈ (A,R≥0), deﬁnes a valuation
function:
vi(a;θi) =
 
wi , if a  A,i Li
0 , otherwise
(1.16)
This valuation is deﬁned with respect to a partial-order  A,i on alterna-
tives A, where a  A,i b if alternative a is at least as preferred to agent i as
alternative b. For example, in the setting of a single-minded CA, then the
alternatives {a : a  A,i Li} correspond to those allocations in which agent i
gets some bundle of items that she demands (and perhaps additional items
24To see this, suppose g(θi,θ−i) = a and g(θ′
i,θ−i) = b and g is truthful, and has corresponding
agent-independent and admissible price function πi(a,θ−i). By admissibility, we have vi(a;θi) −
πi(a, θ−i) ≥ vi(b;θi) − πi(b,θ−i) and vi(b;θ′
i) − πi(b,θ−i) ≥ vi(a;θ′
i) − πi(a,θ−i). Combining,
this gives vi(b;θ′
i) − vi(a; θ′
i) ≥ vi(b;θi) − vi(a;θi), which is W-MON.26 D. C. Parkes
as well, and irrespective of the allocation to other agents.) Deﬁne a partial-
order,  Θ,i on types, with
(θ′
i  Θ,i θi) ⇔ (w′
i ≥ wi) ∧ (Li  A,i L′
i) (1.17)
Adopt fi(θi,θ−i) ∈ {0,1} as shorthand for whether or not agent i is “sat-
isﬁed” (i.e. has value) for the allocation chosen by social choice function f.
Given this, we can deﬁne
Deﬁnition 1.17 A social choice function f is monotonic in a single-minded
domain if whenever fi(θi,θ−i) = 1 and θ′
i  Θ,i θi, then fi(θ′
i,θ−i) = 1.
This simpliﬁed form of monotonicity is necessary and suﬃcient for a truth-
ful social choice function (see Lehmann et al. [LOS02] for an early treat-
ment). The corresponding payment, that makes a mechanism with a mono-
tonic outcome rule truthful, is the critical value payment; where a satisﬁed
agent makes payment pi(θ) = minw′
i s.t. fi(θ′
i,θ−i) = 1, where θ′
i = (Li,w′
i).
One can also cast this result into a one-dimensional domain in which each
agent’s private information is a single number that deﬁnes its value for some
(known) set of alternatives.25 In such domains, the notion of monotonicity
simpliﬁes to value-monotonicity [Mye81, AT01]. Writing f(w) for w ∈ Rn to
emphasize that the type proﬁle is now a vector of numbers, a social choice
function f is value-monotonic if whenever fi(wi,w−i) = 1 and w′
i ≥ wi then
fi(w′
i,w−i) = 1 (where fi(w) = 1 if and only if agent i is satisﬁed by the
outcome). This is necessary and suﬃcient for truthfulness.
Arbitrary Valuation Domains A generalized form of monotonicity,
known as cycle monotonicity, is necessary and suﬃcient for truthfulness
in discrete, but otherwise arbitrary, valuation domains. This early result
due to Rochet [Roc87] is fully general, and holds whatever the structure on
the domain (i.e. in all of the aforementioned settings).26 Rather than state
the condition formally we refer the interested reader to Gui et al. [GMV04]
and Lavi and Swamy [LS07] for a useful exposition. The generality of cycle
monotonicity comes at some cost: the concept can be quite unwieldy to
work with, and only recently has cycle monotonicity been used for practical
mechanism design [MV04, Voh07, LS07].
25An example of such a setting is the so-called “known single-minded CA” [MN02], where the
bundle in which an agent is interested in is known and only its value is private.
26By Roberts [Rob79], we know that cycle monotonicity is equivalent to aﬃne-maximization
for unrestricted domains. On the other hand, as we shall see in the next section, when the
valuation domain imposes structure on agent valuations (e.g. in single-minded CAs), then cycle
monotonicity does not imply aﬃne-maximization.Computational Mechanism Design 27
1.3 Computation by the Center
Computational MD seeks to apply MD to a variety of real-world domains
and, in constructing actual mechanisms, needing to integrate the concerns
of computation and communication eﬃciency from computer science with
the incentives concern of economics. In this section we restrict our attention
to direct-revelation mechanisms, and consider the computational complex-
ity of the problem of computing the outcome of a mechanism. Nisan and
Ronen [NR01] introduced this agenda, requiring useful economic properties
as well as polynomial-time computability. Computational considerations are
especially interesting because they interact with incentive considerations.
For example, naively adopting an approximation algorithm within the VCG
mechanism leads to the unraveling of incentives.
1.3.1 Combinatorial Auctions
A canonical problem in CMD is that of implementing an eﬃcient alloca-
tion in combinatorial auctions. CAs are of practical interest with many
applications (see Chapters 20–23 in Cramton et al. [CSS06]), and of theo-
retical appeal because the eﬃcient allocation problem is NP-hard and also
inapproximable (under reasonable assumptions).
Before continuing we give a very brief introduction to complexity theory,
as it applies to optimization problems such as the winner determination
problem (WDP) in a CA. This exposition is based on that in Lehmann et
al. [LMS06]. An algorithm solves a problem in polynomial time if the run
time (measured in basic arithmetic operations) is bounded above by some
polynomial function of the size of the input. Complexity theory is applied
to decision problems, in which some instance is presented and the algorithm
must decide whether the instance has a particular property. For example,
“is there a feasible allocation with value at least $100” would be a decision
problem in the context of the WDP.
P is the class of decision problems that have a polynomial time algorithm.
It is common to consider problems in P to be tractable while problems
outside of P to be intractable. NP is the class of decision problems for
which there exists a polynomial time algorithm that can check the validity
of a property, when given as input the instance and a certiﬁcate for the
validity. Clearly NP⊇P. A decision problem is NP-hard if a polynomial
time algorithm would imply a polynomial time algorithm for all problems
in NP; the special case of a decision problem that is NP-hard and also
in NP is said to be NP-complete. Finally, an optimization problem whose
decision version is NP-complete is NP-hard. It is generally believed, but28 D. C. Parkes
never proven, that P =NP. The implication is that it is thought unlikely
that an NP-hard optimization problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Before stating the complexity result for the WDP in CAs we need to be
precise about the representation of the input. In a CA there is a set of
goods G, |G| = m, and each alternative a ∈ A corresponds to an allocation
of goods, denoted S = (S1,...,Sn), so that agent i receives bundles of goods
Si ⊆ G. An allocation is feasible if
Si ∩ Sj = ∅, ∀i,j ∈ N (1.18)
Let F(G) denote the set of feasible allocations. Since an agent’s value for
alternative a depends only on its own allocation we write vi(S;θi) to denote
agent i’s value for bundle S. Valuations are normalized, with
vi(∅;θi) = 0, (1.19)
for the empty bundle ∅ and satisfy free disposal, with
vi(S;θi) ≤ vi(T;θi), (1.20)
for all S ⊆ T. The eﬃcient allocation maximizes the total value to all agents,
i.e.
V (N) = max
S∈F(G)
 
i
vi(Si;θi) (1.21)
The representation of the input to the WDP corresponds to the choice
of bidding language. Many bidding languages have been proposed; see
Nisan [Nis06] for a recent survey.
We consider the exclusive-or (XOR) bidding language. An agent’s valua-
tion vi(S;θi) is represented in the XOR language as a set of (bundle,value)
pairs,
θi = {(L1,w1),...,(Lk,wk)} ⊆ 2G × R≥0. (1.22)
The XOR semantics of the bidding language deﬁne valuation function,
vi(S;θi) = max[w : (L,w) ∈ θi,L ⊆ S], (1.23)
so that an agent’s value for a bundle S is the maximal value of all bundles
contained in L that are explicitly stated in the XOR bid.
Example 1.18 For instance, an XOR valuation {(AB,10),(ABC,15),
(D,20)} indicates that an agent has value 10 for AB, 15 for any bundle
containing ABC that does not contain D, and 20 for any bundle containing
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Given an XOR representation the problem of solving the WDP is NP-
hard. This can be established from its equivalence to the NP-hard weighted
set packing problem [RPH98]. This is true even if we restrict instances to
single-minded valuations (described in detail below), and even if every bid
has a value equal to 1 and every bidder only bids on bundles of size at
most 2 [LOS02, LMS06]. The winner determination problem is also inap-
proximable, meaning that no polynomial algorithm can have a competitive
ratio27 better than min(l1−ǫ,m1/2−ǫ) unless NP=ZPP,28 where l denotes the
total number of bundles in the XOR value representation across all agents,
and m is the number of items [H¨ 99, San02, LOS02].
On the other hand, the picture is not all negative. The following three
kinds of computational results exist for the WDP in CAs:
• There exist polynomial-time algorithms for the WDP for restricted prob-
lems; e.g., for sub-classes of agent valuations such as substitutes valuations,
or when all bidders demand bundles of items that have a single-ordering
property, where there is a circular order can be imposed so that all bundles
contain a contiguous sequence of items [M¨ 06, dVV03, RPH98]. There are
also better worst-case approximation guarantees for problems with valu-
ations that do not exhibit complements [DNS05, DS06].
• Heuristic algorithms, for instance local search algorithms or LP-rounding
approaches, can provide good empirical performance on some problem
distributions [HB00, ZN01].
• Algorithms have been developed that can solve large problems (with
tens of thousands of bids and items) to optimality in economically fea-
sible times. These exploit structure in bid representations, and lever-
age new advances in branch-and-cut technology for solving integer pro-
grams [NW99, dVSV07, ATY00, San06, SSGL05].
1.3.2 Case Study: Single Minded CAs
Despite the progress that has been made on the WDP in CAs, the problem
remains NP-hard and combinatorial auctions provide a nice setting in which
to understand some of the tensions that exist between DSIC and compu-
27The competitive ratio of an optimization algorithm B over a set of inputs X is deﬁned as
minx∈X VB(x)/V ∗(x) where VB(x) denotes the value of the solution computed by B on input x
and V ∗(x) denotes the value of the optimal solution.
28ZPP is a sub-class of NP that consists of those decision problems for which there exists an
algorithm that can check the validity of a property, when given as input the instance and a
certiﬁcate for validity, in expected polynomial time. The question of whether NP=ZPP is also an
open problem, although it is generally believed that NP =ZPP.30 D. C. Parkes
tational tractability in CMD. To illustrate these tensions we consider the
special case of CAs with single-minded valuations.
In deﬁning these valuations we follow the outline for single-minded valu-
ations introduced in Section 1.2.5. In a single-minded CA, an agent’s type
θi = (Li,wi) deﬁnes a single interesting bundle, Li, such that:
vi(S;θi) =
 
wi , if S ⊇ Li
0 , otherwise.
(1.24)
As noted above, the WDP with single-minded bids remains NP-
hard [LOS02]. It is interesting, then, to consider a simple greedy approxima-
tion algorithm. The algorithm sorts the bids in decreasing order of wi/|Li|
and then performs a single pass in rank order, allocating a bid when it is
feasible given the bids already accepted. This algorithm is “greedy” because
it accepts bids in order of their per-item value, without consideration of how
these bids might ﬁt with other bids.
Example 1.19 Given types θ1 = {(A,10)}, θ2 = {(AB,19)}, θ3 =
{(B,8)}. The greedy algorithm orders the bids (1,2,3) and implements al-
location (A,∅,B), with bid 2 not allocated because item A is allocated to
bid 1, which has a higher rank.
In what follows we consider a slight generalization to this algorithm, in
which the bids are ordered by wi/|Li|b for some b > 0. Let gb(θ) denote the
allocation computed by a greedy algorithm, where b > 0 is the parameter
that deﬁnes the ranking function (with b = 1 above).
It is instructive to consider the eﬀect of deﬁning a VCG-based mechanism
in which this outcome rule gb is used to determine the outcome and also the
payments:
pi(θ) =
 
j =i
vj(gb(θ−i);θj) −
 
j =i
vj(gb(θ);θj) (1.25)
The payments deﬁned so that agent i pays the negative externality that
it imposes on agents  = i by its presence, given that decisions are made
according to the greedy algorithm.
Example 1.20 Consider again types θ1 = {(A,10)}, θ2 = {(AB,19)}, θ3 =
{(B,8)}, and greedy algorithm with b = 1. We have gb(θ) = (A,∅,B). Now
remove agent 1 to determine gb(θ−1) = (∅,AB,∅), and remove agent 3 to
determine gb(θ−3) = (A,∅,∅). Agent 1’s payment is 19 − 8 = 11 and agent
3’s payment is 10−10 = 0. The mechanism is not IR for agent 1. Moreover,
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is (∅,AB,∅) and its payment is 18 − 0 = 18 since g)b(θ−2) selects outcome
(A,∅,B).
We see the tension between truthful and tractable mechanisms. One can-
not just naively substitute an approximation algorithm into the VCG mech-
anism. More generally, an approximation algorithm must be maximal in
range for truthfulness to be retained [NR00], meaning that it must be opti-
mal for some a priori restricted range of alternatives.
In this case there is a simple solution to the apparent conundrum. Rather
than use a VCG-based method to deﬁne the payment we can collect as
payment from a winning agent the smallest bid that the agent could have
made and still won [LOS02]. This is the critical-value payment introduced
in Section 1.2.5.
Let gb,i(θ) = 1 when agent i is successful given type reports θ and gb,i(θ) =
0 otherwise. The payment is deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 1.21 (critical value payment) Given agent i’s report is
(Li,wi), reports θ−i from agents  = i, and greedy allocation rule gb, the
critical value payment collected from a winning agent i is
pi(Li,θ−i) = min{w′
i ≥ 0 : θ′
i = {(w′
i,S)},gb,i(θ′
i,θ−i) = 1} (1.26)
Example 1.22 In the earlier example, with θ1 = {(A,10)}, θ2 =
{(AB,19)}, θ3 = {(B,8)}, and parameter b = 1, we implement outcome
(A,∅,B) and collect payments p1(θ) = 19/2 = 9.5 (since bid 1 must rank
above bid 2 to win) and p3(θ) = 0 (since bid 3 would be allocated for any
bid value.)
It is easy to check for this example that the new payment rule removes
any incentive for any of the agents to deviate and misreport their private
type. In particular, agent 2 can no longer do better by over-reporting his
value because if he wins then he pay 20 (since this is the smallest bid value
at which his bid will be ranked above that of agent 1).
The LOS mechanism is truthful because the greedy allocation rules are
monotonic, with gb,i(θi,θ−i) = 1 ⇒ gb,i(θ′
i,θ−i) = 1, ∀θ′
i ≻ θi, where
θ′
i = (L′
i,w′
i) ≻ θi = (Li,wi) if and only if L′
i ⊆ Li and w′
i > wi.
Theorem 1.23 [LOS02] The LOS mechanism is truthful for all monotonic
greedy outcome rules. When parameter b = 1/2 then the mechanism achieves
competitiveness m1/2 with respect to eﬃciency, which is the best achievable
across all polynomial-time mechanisms for this problem (unless P=NP), and
when m ≤ n2.32 D. C. Parkes
Proof Fix θ−i and consider agent i with type (Li,wi). Case (a): agent i
wins. First, ﬁx some report ˆ Li. Agent i does not want to misreport wi
because its payment is independent of wi. Second, ﬁx report ˆ wi = wi and
consider a misreport ˆ Li  = Li. A report ˆ Li   Li is not useful because the
agent is single-minded. But then, a report ˆ Li ⊃ Li only leads to a higher
payment. This is because of monotonicity. If pi(ˆ Li,θ−i) < pi(Li,θ−i) for
some ˆ Li ⊃ Li then allocation rule gb fails monotonicity because agent i would
win with report (ˆ Li,pi(ˆ Li,θ−i)+ǫ) but lose with report (Li,pi(ˆ Li,θ−i)+ǫ),
for pi(ˆ Li,θ−i) < pi(ˆ Li,θ−i) + ǫ < pi(Li,θ−i). Case (b): agent i loses. The
only interesting misreports are (ˆ Li, ˆ wi) with ˆ Li ⊇ Li and it is again WLOG
to focus on ˆ Li = Li because of monotonicity, since the critical-value payment
increases with larger bundles. Fixing ˆ Li = Li, agent i cannot win with a bid
ˆ wi < wi by monotonicity, and will pay more than its true value if it wins
because the critical value pi(Li,θ−i) > wi.
The proof that the competitive ratio is m1/2 when b = 1/2, and that this
is tight, is omitted in the interest of space.
Remark. The LOS mechanism stands in contrast to the characterization
result of Roberts [Rob79], which holds that in unrestricted valuation do-
mains the only social choice functions that can be truthfully implemented
are aﬃne maximizers. The greedy allocation rules gb for b > 0 are not
linear-aﬃne maximizers.
1.3.3 Price-Based Characterization
Price-based characterizations provide another way to understand why a
mechanism is truthful, and provide a nice complement to the approaches
based on monotonicity in that the characterization is simple to state and
fully general. The following result is something of a “folk theorem” (and is
recently stated, e.g. in [Seg03, BGN03, LMN03, Yok03]):
Theorem 1.24 A direct revelation mechanism, M =<g,p>, is truthful (or
strategy-proof) if and only if there is a corresponding (agent-independent)
price function πi : A × Θ−i → R, with the property that:
(i) (agent-independent prices) the mechanism collects payment, pi(θ) =
πi(g(θ),θ−i), i.e. the price deﬁned by some agent-independent price
on the alternative selected by the outcome rule.
(ii) (admissible outcome rule) the alternative selected by the mechanism
maximizes the utility to every agent given the price function, i.e.
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Proof (⇐) Agent i cannot change prices πi and maximizes its utility
vi(a;θi) − pi(θ) by reporting its true type θi by admissibility. (⇒) Given
truthful M =<g,p >, construct πi(a,θ−i) = pi(θ′
i,θ−i) where g(θ′
i,θ−i) = a
for some θ′
i and πi(a,θ−i) = ∞ otherwise. For agent-independence, suppose
towards a contradiction that g(θ) = g(θ′
i,θ−i) = a, but pi(θ)  = pi(θ′
i,θ−i),
for some θ′
i  = θi. Without loss of generality, suppose pi(θ) > pi(θ′
i,θ−i).
Then agent i should declare θ′
i. This is a contradiction with truthful-
ness. For admissibility, suppose towards a contradiction that g(θ) = a and
vi(a;θi)−πi(a,θ−i) < vi(b;θi)−πi(b,θ−i) for some θ and some b  = a. Then
agent i should declare θ′
i for which g(θ′
i,θ−i) = b, which is a contradiction
with truthfulness.
The suﬃciency of an agent-independent price function and an admissible
allocation rule for truthfulness is easy to see. The intuition is that of the
familiar act of shopping in a supermarket: the mechanism ﬁxes a price
on all alternatives a ∈ A based on the reports of other agents, and then
promises to choose the alternative that maximizes an agent’s utility based
on the reported valuation function vi(a,θ′
i) of the agent. The agent should
report its true valuation so that the mechanism selects an alternative that
maximizes its utility.
Example 1.25 The VCG mechanism can be interpreted as a price-based
mechanism. For instance, in the case of CAs, the agent-independent price
function that is admissible with respect to the eﬃcient outcome rule g is:
πi(S,θ−i) = V (N\i,G) − V (N\i,G\Si). (1.27)
Where V (N \i,G) = maxS∈F(G)
 
j =i vj(Sj;θj) and V (N \ i,G \ Si) =
maxS∈F(G\Si)
 
j =ivj(Sj;θj). We leave it is an exercise to verify that this
price function corresponds to the payment made by an agent in the VCG
mechanism (i.e., with pi(θ) = πi(S∗
i ,θ−i) where S∗ is the eﬃcient alloca-
tion), and that it maximizes the utility of an agent (i.e., with allocation S∗
maximizing each agent’s utility given this price function).29
This price-based approach has been quite useful in developing tractable
and truthful mechanisms in other domains.
Consider the following examples:
Multi-item CAs. Bartal et al. [BGN03] consider the multi-item CA prob-
lem in which there are multiple copies of each item and each bid is for a
29Yokoo [Yok03] refers to this framework, in the context of CAs, as the “price-oriented rationing
free” (PORF) approach.34 D. C. Parkes
small number of items. A random ordering is imposed on agents and each
agent faces prices on items that are deﬁned in terms of reports from pre-
ceding agents. In the case of agents that demand at most one unit of an
item and a supply with k duplicates of each item, they design a polynomial-
time and truthful mechanism with a worst-case km1/(k−2)-approximation for
eﬃciency.
Digital goods. Price-based methods have led to the development of prior-
free revenue-competitive auctions for digital goods (i.e. with unlimited sup-
ply). The results stand in contrast to those in optimal auction design that
leverage prior information on type distributions. A particularly inﬂuential
idea is that of using some subset of agents (randomly sampled) to deﬁne
prices (or alternatively a revenue target) for another subset of agents. As
long as no agent in the sample set faces the prices constructed from its own
set then the prices are agent-independent. Fiat et al. [FGHK02] and Gold-
berg et al. [GHK+06] have pioneered this approach; see also Segal [Seg03]
and Baliga and Vohra [BV03].
Truthful CAs. Dobzinski et al. [DNS06] develop a truthful polynomial-
time mechanism for the general CA problem with an m1/2-approximation for
eﬃciency. The idea of sampling a subset of agents to deﬁne prices is adopted
for this purpose, and agent valuations are queried via “demand queries”
(see Section 1.4). The randomized mechanism constructs a partition of
agents into three sets. The ﬁrst set of agents is used to estimate the (agent-
independent) prices that are ﬁrst used to parameterize the reserve price in
a second-price auction on the master bundle G of goods to the second set of
agents, and then within a ﬁxed-price auction with random ordering to the
third set of agents.
Budget constraints. Price-based methods have also been adopted to
achieve competitive eﬃciency and revenue results in the presence of budget
constraints [BCI+05, Abr06], where the truthfulness of the VCG mechanism
breaks down because utility functions are no longer quasilinear.
1.3.4 Working with Cycle Monotonicity
Cycle monotonicity is necessary and suﬃcient for the truthfulness of a social
choice function. Gui et al. [GMV04] (and recently Vohra [Voh07]) demon-
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optimization on a network. This opens up the possibility of applying com-
binatorial optimization algorithms in the purpose of automated mechanism
design (see Conitzer and Sandholm [CS03]). Lavi and Swamy [LS07] provide
a general construction, in a scheduling domain, for adapting an approxima-
tion algorithm to make it satisfy cycle monotonicity and also to compute
the required payments. Although there are as yet just a few results, it seems
that working with this general notion of cycle monotonicity (and its graph
theoretic interpretation) may hold promise for CMD.
1.4 Eﬃcient Preference Elicitation
The direct revelation mechanisms that we have studied so far, such as
the VCG mechanism and the LOS mechanism, are completely centralized.
Agents report all of their private information to the center. The center
computes an outcome and reports the outcome (and payments) back to the
agents.
This computational architecture is unappealing in domains for which it
is costly for agents to report their complete type to a center. Consider, for
instance, the use of a VCG mechanism to auction the right to operate bus
lanes in London [CP06]. An agent would be required to report its value
for every possible combination of possible bus lanes, with each combination
potentially entailing a new business plan. This is unreasonable, not only
for reasons of communication complexity but also because of the cost of de-
termining valuations. Similar observations can be made in many business
settings: although ﬁtting within the private values model (so that informa-
tion about the values of other ﬁrms may be irrelevant in determining a ﬁrm’s
own value), it can be a costly process to determine value for diﬀerent out-
comes; e.g., requiring business meetings, information gathering, or solving
complex optimization problems [San93, CJ07, Par05].
In this section, we consider indirect mechanisms, such as ascending price
auctions, and mechanisms that interact with agents through multiple rounds
of preference elicitation. The problem of CAs, paradigmatic in CMD, will
continue to attract much of our attention. Indirect mechanisms, such as
ascending price CAs, have two main computational advantages over direct
mechanisms:
(i) They can allow agents to avoid unnecessary valuation eﬀort and are
often able to implement a social choice function without agents re-
porting (or even needing to know) their exact value for all possible
alternatives. For instance, the winning agent in a single-item ascend-36 D. C. Parkes
ing auction does not need to know its exact value for the item, only
that its value is greater than the ask price in the last round of the
auction. Similarly, the losers do not need to know their exact value,
but only that their value is less than the price in the round in which
they drop out.
(ii) They can distribute some computation to agents. We see this most
clearly with ascending auctions that can be interpreted as primal-dual
or subgradient algorithms: in responding to prices in each round of
the auction, agents are performing part of the computation that is
required to check for complementary-slackness between primal and
dual solutions and thus for the correct implementation of the social
choice function [Par01].
We ﬁrst identify the central role of competitive equilibrium (CE) prices in
characterizing the minimal information that must be elicited from agents
in CAs for the center to determine the eﬃcient allocation, and also VCG
payments. This leads to two main paradigms for the design of useful, indirect
CAs: (a) ascending price auctions that support “straightforward bidding”
in an ex post NE and terminate with CE prices; (b) an approach in which
learning theory is adopted to provide polynomial query complexity, with
demand and value queries used to elicit agent preferences.
1.4.1 Case Study: Role of Competitive Equilibrium in CAs
Consider indirect mechanisms for CAs, and let EFF(θ) denote the set of
eﬃcient allocations for type proﬁle θ. We are interested in indirect mech-
anisms, M =< Σ,g,p >, that implement f(θ) ∈ EFF(θ), for all θ, in an
ex post Nash equilibrium. That is, we require g(s∗(θ)) ∈ EFF(θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ, where s∗ is an ex post Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle. Call such
an indirect mechanism an eﬃcient mechanism.
In the equilibrium of an eﬃcient mechanism, the messages sent by agents
in strategy s∗(θ), for any θ, must provide enough information about types to
deﬁne an eﬃcient allocation. Consider message space W. Following Nisan
and Segal [NS06], let   : Σ × θ → W deﬁne the messages  (s∗,θ) ∈ W sent
by agents to the mechanism for strategy proﬁle s∗ and type proﬁle θ. Let
 −1(s∗(θ)) ⊆ Θ denote the set of types that are consistent with messages
 (s∗,θ), deﬁned as:
 −1(s∗(θ)) = {θ′ :  (s∗,θ′) =  (s∗,θ)} (1.28)
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is some feasible allocation T∗ ∈ F(G), for which:
∀ˆ θ∈ −1(s∗(θ)) =⇒ T∗ ∈ EFF(ˆ θ) (1.29)
In words, there must always be at least one feasible allocation that is
eﬃcient for all types that are possible given the messages reported by agents
in equilibrium.
In fact, given that our interest is in implementing the eﬃcient allocation
in an ex post Nash equilibrium, and also introducing the goal of maximizing
revenue subject to IR constraints, we know from Theorem 1.12 that we must
terminate with VCG payments. Thus, an eﬃcient and revenue-maximal and
IR mechanism must have the property that, for all θ ∈ Θ, there is some
feasible allocation T∗ ∈ F(G) and payments p ∈ Rn, for which:
∀ˆ θ∈ −1(s∗(θ)) =⇒ (T∗,p) ∈ VCG(ˆ θ), (1.30)
where VCG(θ) ⊆ F(G) × Rn denotes the set of eﬃcient allocations and
corresponding VCG payments for types θ.
The following simple example illustrates that it is possible to design in-
direct mechanisms that terminate with the VCG outcome without learning
complete information about agent types.
Example 1.26 Consider a “staged Vickrey auction” (reminiscent of the
eBay proxy auction). In each round an agent can reﬁne a lower and up-
per bound on its value, which is maintained by the center. The auction
maintains an ask price equal to the current second-highest lower bound and
the agent with the highest lower bound (breaking ties at random) as the
provisional winner. In each round, an agent must increase its lower bound
above the ask price or decrease its upper bound to be no greater than the
ask price. Suppose all values are integers. The auction terminates when
only one agent is still bidding, that agent pays the ﬁnal ask price. An ex
post Nash equilibrium is for each agent to increase its lower bound by 1
while its value is greater than the current ask price but not the provisional
winner, and stop bidding by lowering its upper bound otherwise. Consider
an instance with 3 bidders, and types that deﬁne their values for the item.
When θ1 = 10,θ2 = 6,θ3 = 4 the mechanism might terminate with bounds
[7,12],[6,6] and [4,4] for agents 1, 2 and 3 respectively. This is the infor-
mation set  −1(s∗(θ)) in this example. Agent 1 wins for 6, which is the
outcome of the Vickrey auction. The mechanism never learns the true value
of agent 1.
A natural goal that arises in indirect mechanism design is to characterize38 D. C. Parkes
the minimal amount of information that must be elicited by any mechanism
to determine the eﬃcient allocation. This question can be asked both in
the context of cooperative agents and self-interested agents. Competitive
equilibrium (CE) price theory will provide a nice response to this question
and lead, in turn, to natural algorithms for indirect mechanisms.
Let qi(S) ∈ R≥0 deﬁne the price to agent i on bundle of goods S ⊆ G.
Each agent can face individualized (non-anonymous) prices, so that qi(S)  =
qj(S) for i  = j, and non-linear prices, so that qi(S)  = qi(T) + qi(T′) where
(T,T′) partition the goods in S. We require that prices are normalized, so
that qi(∅) = 0 and monotone, so that qi(T) ≥ qi(S) for T ⊇ S. The language
adopted to deﬁne prices is a separate issue. Note that it is not necessary to
explicitly enumerate the price on all bundles.30
Let E(N) = {θ1,...,θn;G} denote an economy, comprised of a set of
agents N = {1,...,n} and a single seller with G goods.
Deﬁnition 1.27 (Demand set) Given prices q = (q1,...,qn), deﬁne
agent i’s demand set as:
Di(q;θi) = {S : vi(S;θi) − qi(S) ≥ max
T⊆G
[vi(T;θi) − qi(T)]}, (1.31)
where Di(q;θi) = {∅} if vi(S;θi) < qi(S) for all ∅  = S ⊆ G.
Deﬁnition 1.28 Prices q = (q1,...,qn) are competitive equilibrium (CE)
prices for economy E(N) if there is an eﬃcient allocation, S∗, for which:
(i) Bundle S∗
i ∈ Di(q;θi) for all i ∈ N
(ii) Allocation S∗ ∈ argmaxS∈F(G)
 
i∈N qi(Si)
Condition (1) states that the bundle is in the demand set of each agent
at the prices. Condition (2) states that the allocation is in the supply set of
the seller at the prices, i.e. it maximizes the seller’s revenue at the prices.
Thus, supply equals demand.
Given that prices can be both non-anonymous and non-linear it is easy
to see that CE prices always exist. For instance, the (trivial) prices qi(S) =
vi(S;θi) for every agent i are CE prices [BO02].
Deﬁnition 1.29 Prices q = (q1,...,qn) are universal competitive equi-
librium (UCE) prices if they are CE prices and if prices q−i =
(q1,...,qi−1,qi+1,...,qn) are CE prices for marginal economy E(N \ i), for
every agent i.
30For example, an XOR language is adopted for prices in the iBundle auction [PU00] and the
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agent ∅ {A} {B} {A,B}
1 0 3 0 3
2 0 0 6 6
3 0 0 2 4
Table 1.4. Example valuations to illustrate UCE prices.
UCE prices always exist. For instance, the (trivial) prices qi(S) = vi(S;θi)
for every agent i are UCE prices.
Example 1.30 In the single item example, with θ1 = 10,θ2 = 6,θ3 = 4, a
price q ∈ [6,10] is an (anonymous) CE price because agent 1 will demand
the item, agents 2 and 3 will have ∅ in their demand sets, and the seller will
want to sell the item. However, only prices q ∈ [4,6] are CE for the marginal
economy E({2,3}). Thus, the only (anonymous) UCE price in the example
is q ∈ [6,10] ∩ [4,6] = {6}.
Example 1.31 Consider an example in which there are two goods A,B
and three agents with valuations deﬁned as in Table 1.4, A UCE price vec-
tor is the following: q1(∅) = q2(∅) = q3(∅) = 0, q1({A}) = 2,q1({B}) =
0,q1({A,B}) = 2, q2({A}) = 0,q2({B}) = 4,q2({A,B}) = 4, q3({A}) = 0,
q3({B}) = 2 and q3({A,B}) = 4. CE price conditions can be veriﬁed for
the eﬃcient allocation (A,B,∅) in E({1,2,3}), allocation (∅,B,A) at prices
q−1 = (q2,q3) in E({2,3}), allocation (A,∅,B) at prices q−2 = (q1,q3) in
E({1,3}) and allocation (A,B,∅) in E({1,2}) at prices q−3 = (q1,q2).
Theorem 1.32 [LCP05] Any mechanism that implements the eﬃcient al-
location, and satisﬁes IR while maximizing revenue to the seller (i.e. an
indirect VCG mechanism) also elicits enough information to determine uni-
versal CE prices.
Thus, although it is not necessary to elicit exact and complete type infor-
mation from agents to determine the outcome of the VCG mechanism in an
indirect mechanism, one must elicit enough information to determine a set
of UCE prices.3132
31Nisan and Segal [NS06] (and Parkes [Par02] for a more restricted setting) ﬁrst showed that CE
prices are necessary for EFF. See Lahaie et al. [LCP05] and Segal [CSS06, chapter 11] for a more
detailed treatment of this result.
32This is not to say that price-based indirect mechanisms, which query agents by asking them
to respond to prices with best-response bundles, are optimal for elicitation. For example, Nisan
and Segal [NS05] demonstrate that there are CA instances that require an exponential number40 D. C. Parkes
A universal price equilibrium is also suﬃcient to compute VCG payments.
Given UCE prices q and an eﬃcient allocation S∗, the VCG payments can
be computed as:
pi(θ) = qi(S∗
i ) − [Πs(q) − Πs(q−i)], (1.32)
where Πs(q) = maxS∈F(G)
 
i qi(Si) (i.e., the maximal possible revenue
to the seller given goods G to sell, prices q, and matching demand) and
Πs(q−i) = maxS∈F(G)
 
j =iqj(Sj) (i.e. the maximal possible revenue to
the seller given goods G to sell, prices q−i = (q1,...,qi−1,qi+1,...,qn), and
matching demand).
Example 1.33 In the single item example with θ1 = 10, θ2 = 6 and θ3 = 4
and UCE price q1 = q2 = q3 = 6, the VCG payment to agent 1 is 6−[Πs(q)−
Πs(q−1)] = 6−(6−6) = 6 since q = (6,6,6) and q−1 = (6,6) and the seller’s
maximal revenue is 6 for both sets of prices.
Example 1.34 In the two good, three seller example in Table 1.4, with
UCE prices as deﬁned above we compute the VCG payments as p1(θ) =
q1({A}) − [Πs(q) − Πs(q−1)] = 2 − (6 − 4) = 0, p2(θ) = q2({B}) − [Πs(q) −
Πs(q−2)] = 4−(6−4) = 2 and p3(θ)({∅})−[Πs(q)−Πs(q−3)] = 0−(0−0) = 0.
The impact of this result is to identify price-based indirect mechanisms
as a particularly interesting class of indirect mechanisms to implement the
eﬃcient allocation in CAs. There is by now a large literature on ascend-
ing price CAs and a smaller literature on the use of price-based queries in
more general elicitation mechanisms. We will discuss each in turn. For
a more complete survey on work in elicitation for CAs see Sandholm and
Boutilier [CSS06, chapter10].
1.4.2 Ascending Price CAs
An ascending price CA maintains (non-anonymous, non-linear) prices pt in
each round and a provisional allocation St. A typical ascending price auction
maintains prices qt = (qt
1,...,qt
n) in each round, and proceeds as follows:
(i) Collect (perhaps untruthful) demand sets Di(qt) ⊆ 2G from each
agent.
(ii) Solve the winner determination problem to maximize revenue given
bids.
of demand queries to determine the eﬃcient allocation while there is a fast eﬃcient elicitation
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(iii) Check termination conditions. Increase prices if the termination con-
ditions are not met.
Some important design questions in formulating an ascending price auc-
tion include: the method used to increase prices, the method used to de-
termine termination, and the activity rules that are imposed to restrict the
feasible strategy space, e.g. by requiring active participation of bidders
across rounds. See Parkes [CSS06, chapter2] for a recent survey.
It has proved very useful to adopt an optimization-based approach to the
design of rules for increasing prices and checking termination. With this
view, an ascending price auction– when coupled with equilibrium bidding
strategies –corresponds to a primal-dual algorithm to solve the eﬃcient al-
location problem [dVSV07, PU00].33
Straightforward bidding, in which an agent truthfully reports its demand
set in each round of the auction given current prices, can be made an ex
post Nash equilibrium by terminating with VCG payments.
In some problems there is a correspondence between minimal CE prices
(the prices that generate the smallest revenue to the seller across all possible
prices) and the VCG payments; e.g., when agents have substitutes but not
complements valuations [AM02] the minimal CE prices, q
i are such that
q
i(S∗
i ) = pi(θ) for all type proﬁles, θ, where pi(θ) is the VCG payment by
agent i. In such an environment, one can design an eﬃcient, ascending-price
CA by deﬁning “minimal price increases” so that the auction terminates at
this minimal CE price vector. The ascending-price (single item) auction in
Section 1.2.2 provides a simple example of such an auction.
Alternatively, one can modify the dynamics of the auction to ensure termi-
nation with UCE prices, from which VCG payments can then be determined
via the adjustment deﬁned in Eq. (1.32). Thus the idea is slightly diﬀer-
ent: the price dynamics can overshoot the minimal CE price vector but the
auction can nevertheless terminate with the VCG payments by computing
discounts from the ﬁnal prices.
To illustrate this approach we describe the class of uQCE-invariant auc-
tions [MP07], which maintain universal quasi-CE prices (uQCE) in every
round. Informally, prices qt are uQCE when demand is at least supply in the
main economy and also in each of the marginal economies. uQCE-invariant
auctions work as follows:
33First one formulates a linear program for the allocation problem. An auction is then interpreted
as a primal-dual or subgradient algorithm. The auction maintains a feasible primal and dual solu-
tion in each round: the allocation, and the current prices. Prices are increased until termination
conditions are satisﬁed, which establish complementary slackness conditions and demonstrate that
the primal and dual solutions are optimal. On termination, the primal solution deﬁnes an eﬃcient
allocation and the dual solution deﬁnes CE prices.42 D. C. Parkes
(i) In round t:
(a) collect demand sets at prices qt
(b) if qt are UCE, then stop
(c) else, select some set of buyers Ut ⊆ B+(qt), from the set of
buyers still bidding, that will see price increases
(d) qt+1
i (S) := qt
i(S) + ǫ for all i ∈ Ut, and all S ∈ Di(qt)
(ii) On termination in round T,
(a) implement the ﬁnal allocation
(b) collect payments qT
i (Si) − [Πs(q) − Πs(q−i)] from each agent.
Proposition 1.35 [MP07] uQCE-invariant auctions terminate with UCE
prices, and thus the VCG outcome, when agents follow straightforward
strategies.
Together with appropriate activity rules this makes straightforward bid-
ding an ex post NE of any uQCE-invariant auction. Activity rules must
be deﬁned to restrict the feasible strategy space to that which supports
straightforward bidding (for some, perhaps untruthful type ˆ θi  = θi) but no
other strategies.
A canonical example is given by the subgradient-based adjustment dy-
namics of iBundle, Extend and Adjust [MP07] (iBEA), which builds on the
iBundle [PU00] auction. In iBEA, the auction chooses in each round a
“pivot” marginal economy (or main economy) that is not yet in CE. The
WDP for this economy is solved, and the adjusted bidders deﬁned as the
losing bidders that are still bidding. The auction terminates when there are
no pivot economies, with the adjusted price giving the VCG outcome.
Example 1.36 [MP07] As an example we illustrate the progress of iBEA
on the CA problem in Table 1.4. In Table 1.5, each row provides the prices
on each bundle to each buyer, and the seller revenue in the main economy
and in each marginal economy. The bid of each buyer is indicated with
parentheses. Comments in each round indicate which allocation is selected
to solve the WDP. The main economy E(N) is adopted as the initial pivot
economy, and retained as the pivot economy until round 7 at which point
the prices are CE for E(N). They are also CE for E({1,3}) and E({1,2}) in
this round. So, pivot economy E({2,3}) is adopted for the ﬁnal two rounds,
at which point iBEA terminates with a UCE price vector.
One might wonder whether non-anonymous and non-linear prices are nec-
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Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3 Revenue
{1} {2} {1,2} {1} {2} {1,2} {1} {2} {1,2} in all
Values → 3 0 3 0 6 6 0 2 4 economies
1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) (0) 0 0 (0) {0,0,0,0}
Pivot: E(N). WD selects {{1},{2},∅}.
2 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) (0) 0 0 (1) {1,1,1,0}
Pivot: E(N). WD selects {∅,∅,{1,2}}.
3 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) (1) 0 0 (1) {2,1,1,2}
Pivot: E(N). WD selects {{1},{2},∅}.
4 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) (1) 0 (0) (2) {2,2,2,2}
Pivot: E(N). WD selects {{1},{2},∅}.
5 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) (1) 0 (1) (3) {3,3,3,2}
Pivot: E(N). WD selects {∅,∅,{1,2}}.
6 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) (2) (0) (1) (3) {4,3,3,4}
Pivot: E(N). WD selects {{1},{2},∅}.
7 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) (2) (0) (2) (4) {4,4,4,4}
CEs of economies E(N),E(N−2), and E(N−3) are reached.
Note: Buyer 3 also demands ∅ from this round onwards.
{{1},{2},∅} is an eﬃcient allocation of E(N).
Pivot: E(N−1). WD selects {∅,∅,{1,2}}.
Buyer {2} is unsatisﬁed.
8 (2) 0 (2) 0 (3) (3) (0) (2) (4) {5,4,4,5}
Pivot: E(N−1). WD selects {∅,∅,{1,2}}.
Buyer {2} is unsatisﬁed.
9 (2) 0 (2) 0 (4) (4) (0) (2) (4) {6,4,4,6}
An UCE price vector is reached.
Final allocation: {{1},{2},∅}; Final payment: (0,2,0).
Table 1.5. Progress of iBEA for an example
show that they are necessary for general CA instances, although there
are classes of problems (such as additive valuations) for which an auction
such as iBEA needs an exponential price space while auctions with lin-
ear prices (q(S) =
 
j∈S qj) need only m prices. In addition, Mishra and
Parkes [MP07] show that non-anonymous and non-linear prices are required
for “natural” ascending auctions even for substitutes valuations. See also
Gul and Stacchetti [GS00].44 D. C. Parkes
1.4.3 Price-Based Elicitation via Learning Theory
Elicitation for CAs can also be addressed by drawing an analogy with meth-
ods in computational learning theory (CLT) [ZBS03, BJSZ04].
We will consider a general method to convert learning algorithms into
elicitation algorithms [LP04]. Whereas learning can posed as the problem
of determining the exact valuation function of an agent, the problem of
elicitation is diﬀerent. The goal in elicitation is to learn just enough about
the valuations of agents to be able to determine the eﬃcient allocation, and
(in order to provide incentive properties) the VCG payments.
The use of learning algorithms provides another beneﬁt in application
to elicitation, and even if exact valuations are eventually learned. This is
because learning algorithms work with simple “oracle” models of the ques-
tions that an agent can answer and do not assume that an agent already
knows how to represent its valuation in a given representation class, such as
a bidding language. The relevant measure of this is the “query complexity,”
which is often stated in terms of the minimal representation of a valuation
function, given a language.
We ﬁrst summarize the model of exact query learning. In exact query
learning from membership and equivalence queries, the goal is to identify
an unknown target function h : X → Y , from some class, via queries to
an oracle. A representation class C is adopted to encode the functions.
For instance, the function could be a monotone Boolean function and the
representation class the monotone DNF formulae.
The two kinds of queries in the learning context are:
• Membership query. The learner presents some x and the oracle replies
with h(x).
• Equivalence query. The learner presents its current estimate, the manifest
hypothesis ˜ h and the oracle either replies ‘YES’ if ˜ h = h, or returns a
counterexample x such that ˜ h(x)  = h(x).
Deﬁnition 1.37 (eﬃcient learnability) Representation class C can be
polynomial-query exactly learnable from membership and equivalence
queries if there is an algorithm that can determine a representation ˜ h ∈ C,
for which ˜ h(x) = h(x) for all x ∈ X, in a number of queries that is polynomial
in m = dim(X) and size(h), which is the minimal size of h in representation
class C.
Thus, a class can be eﬃciently learned if, for all possible functions that
can be represented in the class, there is an algorithm that asks a small (i.e.Computational Mechanism Design 45
Learning Elicitation
Function class C Valuation classes, V1,...,Vn
e.g. monotone Boolean functions e.g. free disposal
Representation class C Bidding languages L1,...,Ln
e.g. monotone DNF formulae e.g. XOR bids
Target function h : X → Y Valuations vi : 2G → R≥0
boolean X, dim(X) = m m goods
boolean or real Y
Membership query Value query
query: x, resp.: h(x) ∈ Y query: S ∈ 2G, resp.: vi(S) ∈ R≥0
Equivalence query Demand query
query: hypothesis ˜ h query: S ∈ 2G, prices qi : 2G → R≥0
resp.: ‘YES,’ if resp.: ‘YES,’ if
˜ h(x) = h(x), ∀x ∈ X Si ∈ argmaxS∈2G[vi(S) − qi(S)]
else, some x′ s.t. ˜ h(x′)  = h(x′) else, some S′ s.t.
vi(S′) − qi(S′) > vi(Si) − qi(Si)
Table 1.6. Computational Learning Theory vs. Elicitation
polynomial) number of queries in the size of the minimal possible represen-
tation of the function. If the function is simple to represent then it should
be simple to learn. Learning theory is interested in understanding the query
complexity of representation classes and developing eﬃcient algorithms.
We now compare query learning with that of elicitation. See Table 1.6. To
enable as direct a comparison as possible we suppress the semantics of type
and deal directly with valuation classes, which correspond to type classes,
and valuation functions which correspond to valuations deﬁned for some
particular type.
In eﬃcient elicitation from value and demand queries, the goal is to iden-
tify an eﬃcient allocation for some class of valuations vi : 2G → R≥0, via
queries to agents. In place of a representation class is a bidding language,
L, which describes an instance of the class.
The two kinds of queries in the elicitation context are:
• Value query. The elicitation algorithm presents some bundle S to an agent
and the agent is asked to reply with its value vi(S).
• Demand query. The elicitation algorithm presents a bundle Si and prices
qi to an agent and the agent is asked to reply ‘YES,’ if the bundle is in
its demand set at the prices, or return a counterexample S′ such that
vi(S′) − qi(S′) > vi(Si) − qi(Si) otherwise.
Deﬁnition 1.38 (eﬃcient elicitation) The valuation classes V1,...,Vn46 D. C. Parkes
are said to be polynomial-query elicited from value and demand queries
if there is an algorithm that can determine an eﬃcient allocation S∗ ∈
argmaxS∈F(G)
 
i vi(Si) for any (v1,...,vn) ∈ V1 × ... × Vn in a number
of queries that are polynomial in the number of goods m, the number of
agents n, and maxi size(vi), which is the maximum size across all agents of
the minimum representation of each agent’s valuation function.
This deﬁnition diﬀers from that for query learning in that the goal is to
determine the eﬃcient allocation, which need not require learning the exact
valuation of every agent.
Membership queries are completely equivalent to value queries and equiv-
alence queries can be simulated as demand queries. Consider a manifest
hypothesis ˜ vi ∈ Vi for agent i’s value, and bundle Si that is in the demand
set for an agent with valuation ˜ vi at prices qi. Then, if agent i responds with
a preferred bundle S′ when presented with demand query demand(Si,qi) ei-
ther vi(Si)  = ˜ vi(Si) or vi(S′)  = ˜ v(S′). Value queries can then be issued to
determine which of the two bundles Si and S′ is the counterexample.
Based on this observation, Lahaie and Parkes [LP04] show how to convert
a learning algorithm to an elicitation algorithm.
Theorem 1.39 [LP04] The eﬃcient allocation can be determined in
poly(n,m, maxi size(vi)) value and demand queries for valuation classes
V1,...,Vn, if they can each be polynomial-query exactly learned from mem-
bership and equivalence queries.
The idea is to simulate a separate learning algorithm for each agent. We
conceptualize this as occurring with an “proxy” for the agent. When the
learning algorithm requires a membership query, this is immediately issued
by the proxy as a value query to the agent. When the learning algorithm
requires an equivalence query, the proxy waits to issue a demand query to
the agent until CE prices have been updated. Only when every proxy (and
its corresponding learning algorithm) is at the point where it requires the
answer to an equivalence query are new CE prices computed. A provisional
allocation and CE prices are computed based on the current manifest val-
uations, as known to each proxy. This allocation and price tuple is then
issued to agents as demand queries. If all agents reply ‘Yes,’ we have found
an eﬃcient allocation and the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, it is guar-
anteed that one or more proxies will ﬁnd a counterexample to their current
manifest, and the relevant agent’s learning algorithm can proceed.
For equilibrium considerations we can again appeal to the VCG mech-
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query-based elicitation is one in which an agent responds truthfully to ev-
ery query. For demand queries this means responding ‘YES’ if and only if
the proposed bundle is in the true demand set, and providing a preferred
bundle otherwise. Lahaie et al. [LCP05] extend demand queries to universal
demand queries,34 and generalize the elicitation algorithm to terminate with
UCE prices and adjust to VCG payments. This brings the straightforward
strategy into an ex post Nash equilibrium.
These query-learning based methods can be applied to the following rep-
resentation classes for CAs:
(i) Polynomial bidding language. For instance vi(S) = a0x1+a1(x1x3)−
a2(x1x5), where xj ∈ {0,1} indicates if good j is allocated to the
agent. These are concise for valuations that are almost substitutes
and fully expressive. A learning algorithm due to Schapire and
Sellie [SS93] leads to elicitation with O(nmt) demand queries and
O(nmt3) value queries, where t is the maximal size of the (minimally
represented) valuation of each agent for the particular instance under
consideration.
(ii) XOR bidding language. The XOR language is concise for valuations
that are almost complements and fully expressive. A generalization of
a learning algorithm due to Angluin [Ang87] for monotone DNF for-
mulae leads to elicitation in O(nt) demand queries and O(nmt) value
queries where t is the maximal size of the (minimally represented)
valuation of each agent for the particular instance under considera-
tion.
(iii) Atomic languages. The atomic languages generalize the XOR lan-
guage, for example deﬁning a language that is concise for additive
valuations where XOR is not. Lahaie et al. [LCP05] provide a learn-
ing algorithm for this setting, and support elicitation in O(nmt) de-
mand queries and O(nt) value queries, where t is the maximal size of
the (minimally represented) valuation of each agent for the particular
instance under consideration.
It is interesting that an exponential number of demand queries are re-
quired to learn an XOR representation if queries are restricted to linear
prices [BJSZ04]; thus, we again see the power of non-linear price queries.
34A universal demand query presents an agent with prices p and n bundles, representing the
bundle allocated to agent i in the main economy and in each of the marginal economies in which
it is present. An agent is asked to respond ‘YES,’ if every bundle is in its true demand set and
otherwise provide a preferred bundle.48 D. C. Parkes
1.5 Distributing the Computation to Agents
In a direct mechanism, the agents report their types and then wait for
the outcome and payments to be determined by the center. In an indirect
mechanism, such as an ascending price auction, the agents are also perform-
ing useful computation by computing their demand sets in response to the
current prices. Distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD), as in-
troduced by Feigenbaum and colleagues [FPSS02, FS02], and extended to
Distributed Implementation (DI) by Parkes and Shneidman [PS04b, SP04b]
to better encompass equilibrium considerations, pushes this distribution one
step further.35 The ultimate goal is to be able to completely remove the
center and have the agents determine the outcome of a mechanism amongst
themselves, by distributing the required computation.
For instance, we might ask agents to communicate partial information
about their types with each other, and structure the problem solving
amongst themselves, before coming to a shared consensus about the ap-
propriate decision and payments. In addition to the beneﬁts of robustness
and scalability that can accrue from distributed computation, this distribu-
tion may be necessary, for instance in an Internet-scale application in which
the dynamics and scale preclude one center having a full view of the entire
state of the system.
Because the same self-interested agents that care about the outcome of
the mechanism are now also involved in the computation, this distribution
necessitates expanding the strategic considerations from those of incentive-
compatibility (with its focus on truthful information revelation) to also in-
clude computation- and communication compatibility so that agents will
choose to faithfully follow the rules of the mechanism. What is possible will
also be constrained by physical considerations, for instance by the network
communication topology.
The primary objectives in DI are to couple good communication and com-
putational properties with faithfulness, so that the computation and mes-
sage passing actions required of nodes forms a game-theoretic equilibrium.
The earlier examples of ascending price auctions already provide a simple
version of this: the agents choose, in equilibrium, to determine their cor-
rect demand sets in response to the prices generated by the auction in each
round. DI equates a distributed algorithm with an agent strategy and the
35Distributed games [MT99] are also relevant, which provide a formalism to study the eﬀect
of communication structures on the problem of implementing social choice functions in multi-
agent systems. Relevant work in distributed artiﬁcial intelligence (DAI), considers algorithms
for distributed constrained optimization (DCOP) in message-passing computational architec-
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algorithm must, itself, form an equilibrium. See Feigenbaum et al. [FSS07]
for a comprehensive survey.
1.5.1 DI: Preliminaries
In full generality, DI need not have a dedicated center. The traditional
center’s duties of deciding an outcome and payments are still done, just not
by a dedicated, trusted mechanism-designer introduced node. However, it
is most convenient in the current treatment to retain the notion of a center,
although it will play a much smaller role than in standard MD.36
An instance of DI, dM = (Σ,g,p;sm), is deﬁned in terms of a strategy space
Σ = (Σ1 × ...Σn), an outcome rule g : Σ → A, a payment rule p : Σ → Rn
and an intended strategy (or intended algorithm) sm = (sm
1 ,...,sm
n ) where
sm
i : Θi → Σi.
Formally, this deﬁnition augments that of an indirect mechanism (see
Section 1.2.2) with the intended strategy, sm. This strategy represents the
algorithm “intended” by the designer, i.e. that which the designer wishes the
agents to follow. But, hidden under the covers are some deeper diﬀerences:
(i) In DI, some agents may not be able to send messages directly to the
center and agents may be able to send messages directly to other
agents. This is captured within the strategy space Σ.
(ii) In DI, an agent’s strategy sm(θi) ∈ Σi can deﬁne messages that it will
send to one or more agents in addition to the center, and messages
that it will forward on behalf of other agents.
(iii) In DI, an agent’s strategy sm(θi) ∈ Σi can deﬁne computation that
it will perform in response to messages received.
(iv) In DI, the center (if one exists) need not receive enough information
about the types of agents to be able to compute for itself the outcome
and payments.
DI is best conceptualized as a distributed and asynchronous message-
passing algorithm on a communication graph with agents located on nodes
of the graph. The center is just viewed as another (trusted) node. There can
be limited connectivity between agents, and between agents and the center.
Rules g and p deﬁne the outcome and payments selected based on messages
36The subset of messages that are communicated between agents and the center ultimately deter-
mine the outcome. A fully distributed implementation would terminate with shared state that is
suﬃcient to deﬁne the outcome and also be self-enforcing, in that agents would not deviate from
the outcome, once computed. We are not aware of completely distributed implementations at this
time; for instance (at least) a trusted bank, able to receive messages from any agent and collect
payments, seems to be required in current work.50 D. C. Parkes
that are received by the center. The computational agents asked to follow
the algorithm are self-interested and will deviate from the algorithm if this
is in their best-interest.
Agents have internal, computational actions, and external actions in which
they send (private) messages to other agents with which they are connected.
The feasible strategy space Σi constrains the external actions, in that the
center, and other agents when following the intended algorithm, will only re-
spond to “legal” messages. The expanded strategy space can allow an agent
to misrepresent the reported type of another agent when used as a relaying
node, or perform computation that aﬀects the outcome of the mechanism.
Given that activities beyond information-revelation are now allowed we
extend the notion of IC from DRMs, and introduce the following solution
concept, which is central to DI:
Deﬁnition 1.40 Distributed implementation dM is ex post faithful if in-
tended strategy sm is an ex post Nash equilibrium for all types θ ∈ Θ.
Faithfulness can be deﬁned for game-theoretic solution concepts other
than ex post NE. However, ex post NE seems especially useful and is adopted
in current work on DI.
For analysis, it is useful to logically partition the actions performed by the
intended strategy, sm
i , and thus the strategy itself, into three diﬀerent com-
ponents. For a strategy to be partitioned into diﬀerent components means
that in each information state, exactly one of the component strategies is
deﬁned, and consulted to determine the action taken by the agent. Let
sm
−i(θ−i) = (sm
1 (θ1),...,sm
i−1(θi−1),sm
i+1(θi+1,...,sm
n (θn)). The actions are
divided into the following components:
(rm
i ) information-revelation actions. Let rm
i denote the component of
strategy sm
i that is equivalent, in equilibrium, to reporting informa-
tion about an agent’s type. Formally, for all strategies ˆ si that diﬀer
from sm
i only in component rm
i , and for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i, there exists
some ˆ θi ∈ Θi, for which:
g(ˆ si,sm
−i(θ−i)) = g(sm
i (ˆ θi),sm
−i(θ−i)) (1.33)
p(ˆ si,sm
−i(θ−i)) = p(sm
i (ˆ θi),sm
−i(θ−i)). (1.34)
(pm
i ) message passing actions. Let pm
i denote the component of strategy
sm
i that deﬁnes an action in which the agent sends a message received,
unchanged, to one or more neighbors or the center.
(cm
i ) computation actions. Let cm
i denote the component of strategy thatComputational Mechanism Design 51
deﬁnes a computational action, which is an action that is not mes-
sage passing and whose eﬀect cannot be simulated by following the
intended strategy for some alternate type ˆ θi  = θi.
By the deﬁnition of information-revelation actions, any strategy ˆ si that
only deviates from the intended strategy in information states in which strat-
egy rm
i is deﬁned will have an eﬀect that can also be achieved by following the
intended strategy sm
i but for some type ˆ θi ∈ Θi, possibly untruthful. This
is the sense in which this component of the strategy is the information-
revelation component.37 On the other hand, in an information state in
which the computational component cm
i of the intended strategy is deﬁned,
the agent can have the eﬀect of misrepresenting the information reported by
another agent, or changing the deﬁnition of the outcome or payment rules
of the mechanism, by deviating to another action. This aspect of an agent’s
strategy, as well as that of message-passing, is new to DI and can present
new opportunities for strategic behavior.
Given this decomposition into diﬀerent strategy components, faithfulness
can be usefully decomposed into three corresponding components:
(IC) Incentive-compatible. A DI, dM, is incentive-compatible (IC) if every
agent will respond to all of its intended information-revelation actions
rm
i in an ex post NE, for all type proﬁles θ ∈ Θ.
(CC) Communication-compatible. A DI, dM, is communication-compatible
(CC) if every agent will perform all of its intended message passing
actions pm
i in an ex post NE, for all type proﬁles θ ∈ Θ.
(AC) Algorithm-compatible. A DI, dM, is algorithm-compatible (AC) if
every agent will perform all of its intended computational actions cm
i
in an ex post NE, for all type proﬁles θ ∈ Θ.
This makes clear that faithfulness extends the more traditional concern of
truthful information revelation to other kinds of deviations. Note that it is
without loss of generality to assume that the intended information-revelation
actions are truth-revealing, and so the property of IC will be equated with
a strategy in which agents respond truthfully to queries, from other agents
or from the center, about their type. We have the following, which follows
immediately from the way in which IC, CC and AC have been deﬁned:
Proposition 1.41 [SP04b] A distributed implementation is ex post faithful
37For example, the feasible strategy space in the uQCE-invariant auctions deﬁned in Section 1.4.2
only includes information-revelation actions, since all deviations from straightforward bidding
select the outcome of the VCG mechanism for some (possibly untruthful) valuation.52 D. C. Parkes
when the intended strategy is IC, CC and AC in the same ex post Nash
equilibrium.
1.5.2 Extended Example: Second-price Auction
The following example will serve to illustrate the deﬁnitions introduced
above as well as suggest some of the challenges in designing faithful pro-
tocols. Consider a distributed second-price auction dM =<Σ,g, p;sm> for
a single item in which there is a communication graph structured as a tree
rooted at the center. One agent is associated with each node of the tree. Let
θi denote agent i’s value. Agents communicate with messages w = (v1,v2,x)
where v1 and v2 are the ﬁrst- and second highest value the agent has seen
(including its own), and x is the identity of the agent with the highest value.
Use “upstream” and “downstream” to denote towards and away from the
root, respectively. The intended strategy, sm, has the following components:
(i) information-revelation: Send message (vi,0,i) to the upstream agent
on receiving a START message.
(ii) computation: Maintain internal state (v1,v2,x), initialized to v1 =
θi, v2 = 0 and x = i. Upon receiving message (v′
1,v′
2,x′) from a
downstream agent, update v1 := max(v1,v′
1), v2 := {v1,v2,v′
1,v′
2}(2)
(i.e. the second-highest seen), and x := x′ if v′
1 > v1. If the local state
has changed, then send message (v1,v2,x) to the upstream neighbor.
(iii) message-passing: Upon receiving a START message, send START to
all downstream neighbors.
The outcome rule g : Σ → A deﬁnes the winner of the auction as the
agent for whom the highest value is reported by the neighbors to the center.
Assume that all messages take a ﬁnite time and the center knows the max-
imal number of agents and so knows when it can terminate the mechanism
and make the ﬁnal decision. The payment rule p : Σ → Rn
≥0 deﬁnes the
payment by the winner as the second highest value received by the center
(in either value entry of an incoming message), with all other agents making
zero payment. The feasible strategy space limits agents to sending either the
message START (as the ﬁrst message sent to each downstream neighbor), or
messages to upstream neighbors with syntax (v1,v2,x) where v1,v2 ∈ R≥0
and x ∈ N.
Example 1.42 For a concrete instance of this problem of DI see Figure 1.2.
The mechanism is IC (for the simple reason that in equilibrium only the
agents directly connected to the center will aﬀect the outcome via theirComputational Mechanism Design 53
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Fig. 1.2. An example of a second price distributed auction [not faithful].
report), but not AC or CC. AC fails. For instance, agent 3 in the ﬁgure
should never propagate any value information that it receives from down-
stream agents (e.g. (25,0,4) from agent 4). Rather it should deviate and
claim that it has received no bids from downstream. CC fails. For instance,
agent 3 should never propagate the START message to downstream agents
because it would rather them not participate in the auction.
1.5.3 Analysis Techniques
With all these deﬁnitions in hand we are ready to develop some faithful DIs.
It might be surprising that this is possible, given the apparent complexity
of establishing that an intended algorithm is IC, CC, and AC. The analysis
techniques introduced below will be subsequently illustrated in a sequence
of case studies.
Strong Compatibility
It is if course not suﬃcient to assume AC and CC and then prove IC, and
then assume AC and IC and prove CC, and ﬁnally assume CC and IC and
prove AC. This is because agents can also jointly deviate from multiple
components of their strategy at the same time.
Progress can be made by the following observation. We deﬁne strong ver-
sions of AC and CC, and then appeal to the dominant-strategy truthfulness
of direct-revelation mechanisms to get faithfulness.
Deﬁnition 1.43 A distributed implementation is strong CC (resp. strong
AC) if an agent will perform all of its intended message-passing actions pm
i
(resp. computational actions cm
i ) in the ex post NE of a restricted game in54 D. C. Parkes
which it is forced to deviate from its information-revelation actions rm
i and
computational actions cm
i (resp. message-passing actions pm
i ) in an arbitrary
way, for all types θi and all types θ−i.
A DI dM is said to be equivalent to DRM, M′ =<g′,p′>, with g′ and p′
deﬁned so that g(sm(θ)) = g′(θ) and p(sm(θ)) = p′(θ). Given this, we have
the following:
Theorem 1.44 [SP04b] A strong CC and strong AC distributed implemen-
tation that is equivalent to a DSIC mechanism M is faithful as long as the
information-revelation actions are restricted to be consistent.
This holds by an argument similar to that employed in the revelation
principle. Once the new opportunities for manipulation provided to agents
within a DI have been shown to be ineﬀective the faithfulness is inherited
from the DSIC of the equivalent DRM.
Partition Principle
For illustrative purposes, consider the following “canonical distributed al-
gorithm” to determine the outcome of a VCG mechanism. To keep things
simple, it assumes that every agent can communicate directly with the center
without sending messages through other agents.
• (step 1) Each agent reports its type ˆ θi to the center.
• (step 2) The center involves some subset of the agents in computing a
solution g(ˆ θ) and g(ˆ θ−i) for each marginal economy E(N \ i). This step
can utilize a variety of distributed algorithms.
• (step 3) The center receives reported solutions a′ = g′(ˆ θ), a′
−1 =
g′(ˆ θ−1),...,a′
−n = g′(ˆ θ−n) (where a′ and g′ are adopted to denote that
they may not be correct).
• (step 4) These reports are used to deﬁne the outcome of the VCG mech-
anism:
(i) Alternative a′ is selected as the outcome.
(ii) Payments pi(θ) =
 
j =i vj(a′
−i; ˆ θj) −
 
j =ivj(a′; ˆ θj).
To see that agent i can usefully deviate from the intended strategy, notice
that it can now aﬀect the ﬁrst component of its payment term, pi(θ) =  
j =i vj(a′
−i; ˆ θj), the payment which is usually independent of its strategy.
Here, if agent i is involved in the computation of a′
−i then it should obstruct
the computation of the best alternative in the marginal economy without i.Computational Mechanism Design 55
Theorem 1.45 [PS04b] A canonical distributed VCG implementation with
an intended strategy sm in which computation is partitioned so that no de-
viation from agent i can aﬀect the correct solution of g(θ−i) is faithful.
A canonical distributed VCG implementation that satisﬁes this partition
principle has the property that deviating from the intended computational
actions has no more eﬀect than deviating from truthful revelation. Just
as it is in an agent’s best interest to report its true type, it is an agent’s
best interest to assist in computing the best alternative given the reports
of all agents. An agent is indiﬀerent to performing the computation of the
solutions to marginal economies for other agents, because this just aﬀects the
payment of other agents. Computation, when assigned carefully, becomes
no more useful than revelation.
Example 1.46 Consider the following simple example. This is for a single-
minded CA, as introduced in Section 1.3.2. Each agent is interested in
a single bundle of goods G = {A,B,C}, with types: θ1 = {(ABC,14)},
θ2 = {(B,8)}, θ3 = {(AC,12)}. A valid assignment of agents to perform
computation (that will give faithfulness) is: agent 1 for the problem without
agent 3, agents 2 and 3 for the problem without agent 1, and agents 2 and
3 for the entire problem.
This principle can also be used in the context of blackboard-based algo-
rithms, where the blackboard is “moderated” by the center, and only agents
other than i are allowed to post improvements to the solution g(θ−i) [PS04b].
Information-Revelation Principle
A second principle is the information-revelation principle. This is a corollary
of Theorem 1.44, but worth stating explicitly:
Corollary 1.47 A distributed implementation that is equivalent to a DSIC
mechanism M is faithful if the only actions available in the feasible strategy
space are information-revelation actions, and as long as the information-
revelation must be consistent.
This explains, for instance, why ascending price CAs that terminate with
the VCG outcome have straightforward bidding in an ex post NE. Simi-
larly, distributed optimization algorithms from operations research such as
Dantzig-Wolfe, Bender’s, and methods such as column generation and La-
grangian relaxation [BHM77, Geo70] involve only information-revelation and
provide faithful DIs for the VCG mechanism.56 D. C. Parkes
Redundancy Principle
A third principle is the redundancy principle. This supposes that the com-
putation required in determining g and p in mechanism M =<g,p> can be
divided into a sequence of ﬁnite computational step. The pieces can then
be dispatched to agents in one of two ways:
• Each piece can be given to two agents, along with all necessary inputs to
perform the computation. If both agents respond with the same result
then that is adopted by the center and the next computational step is
dispatched. Otherwise, the center steps in and repeats the computation
itself and punishes one or both agents, whichever is found to have deviated
(e.g. with a ﬁne.)
• Each piece can be given to three or more agents, along with all necessary
inputs to perform the computation. The mechanism then adopts the
quorum outcome.
Collectively, we refer to this approach (which provides strong AC) as
“chunk-and-dispatch”.
Theorem 1.48 [PS04b] A distributed implementation dM that is equivalent
to a DSIC mechanism M is faithful if all computation is performed with
redundancy via chunk-and-dispatch.
Example 1.49 The redundancy principle can be used to structure dis-
tributed computation of tree search, in determining the outcome of winner
determination in a CA. Pairs of agents can be used dynamically to search
below a node in the search tree, e.g. performing a particular number of node
expansions before passing the updated search frontier back to the center.
1.5.4 Case Study: Lowest Cost Routing
Feigenbaum et al. [FPSS02] (FPSS) study a distributed algorithm to com-
pute VCG payments for lowest-cost inter-domain routing. For an example
see Figure 1.3. Each node has an associated agent, and represents an au-
tonomous system on the Internet. Agents have transit costs for forwarding
messages to other nodes. In the example, node Z has transit cost 1000 for
forwarding messages from A to C, or from B to C.
The social objective is to compute all pairwise lowest cost paths (LCPs).
For instance, the LCP from X to Z is 2, and goes via D and C. The LCP
from X to B is 0 and involves no transit nodes. This is a MD problem
because the transit cost at each node is private to that node. This is,Computational Mechanism Design 57
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Fig. 1.3. An example of LCP inter-domain routing.
more broadly, a DAMD problem and one of DI, because there is no central
computational node; rather, the algorithm for LCP must be distributed and
nodes are self-interested.
FPSS propose a modiﬁcation to the local state that each node maintains,
and retain the basic message passing structure of BGP, extending the al-
gorithm so that the algorithm computes VCG payments as well as LCPs.
Realize that VCG payments will be made to transit nodes because they in-
cur costs. VCG payments are made by nodes with node-originating traﬃc
to compensate nodes that provide transit capacity. The graph is assumed
to be biconnected so that VCG payments are well deﬁned. Without this,
the marginal positive eﬀect on the cost of a path due to a node with a piv-
otal position in the network is unbounded, and its VCG payment would be
unbounded.
In the example, the VCG payment made by node X for X-originating
traﬃc with destination Z is to transit nodes D and C. Node D receives
payment 5 and node C receives payment 5. In both cases, this represents
the maximal cost that each node could have reported and still formed the
LCP from X to Z.
However, the FPSS algorithm is not faithful. The most obvious way
in which FPSS fails faithfulness is because the sender, X in our example,
is ultimately responsible for computing its own payment. X would prefer
to deviate from this computation. Even without this problem, nodes can
beneﬁt by overstating the transit cost of nodes on competing paths, to boost
the payments they receive in the VCG scheme.
Shneidman and Parkes [SP04b] make FPSS faithful by splitting the pro-58 D. C. Parkes
tocol into three phases (two construction and one execution, in which traﬃc
ﬂows and payments are made and collected), and using redundancy and the
idea of “catch and punish” to make the implementation strong AC and strong
CC within each phase, irrespective of behaviors in other phases. Faithfulness
leverages the biconnectedness of the graph, so that no agent can unilaterally
block information ﬂow.
The most important idea is that of assigning every neighbor of a node as a
checker node. For instance, nodes A,B and D act as checker nodes for node
X (as well as principal nodes in their own right). The intended strategy is
augmented so that the principal is required to relay all messages it receives
to every checker node. CC is established for this aspect of the strategy
because there is always at least one checker that knows about any message
the principal receives (because it was the sender!), and thus a deviation is
caught when the checkers compare local state at the end of a phase. All
checker nodes replicate all computation of the principal node; again, this is
shown to be AC through a catch-and-punish argument. A limited center is
assumed to compare the states of checker nodes and impose penalties if a
mismatch is discovered.
1.5.5 Case Study: Faithful Distributed Constrained Optimization
Petcu et al. [PFP06] have provided a faithful DI, called M-DPOP, for solv-
ing distributed constraint optimization problems (DCOP). In a DCOP, each
agent is associated with a variable Xi with domain di and is responsible for
setting the value of its variable. There are hard constraints that preclude
certain values in combination for pairs of variables. Finally, there are rela-
tions, R = {r1,...,rn} where ri is the set of relations known to agent i and
relation r
j
i is a function d1 ×...×dk → R that deﬁnes a value to agent i for
each possible combination of values of the involved variables. The objective
in DCOP is to ﬁnd the optimal solution x∗ = argmaxx∈F
 
i
 
r∈ri r(x),
where F deﬁnes the set of feasible assignments given the hard constraints.
DCOP assumes a message passing architecture. Each agent is connected
in the communication graph to all agents for which it has a relation with
that agent’s value in its domain, or that shares a hard constraint with its
variable. A number of optimal and complete (i.e. will solve all instances)
DCOP algorithms are known, able to terminate with the value-maximizing
assignment of values that satisﬁes all hard constraints [ML04, MSTY05,
PF05]. However, none of these algorithms are faithful in the sense of DI.
M-DPOP extends the DPOP algorithm [PF05], making it faithful so that
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as the other agents follow the algorithm). In doing so, M-DPOP retains the
useful computational properties of DPOP [PF05], including a linear number
of messages, each of size that is exponential in a parameter that scales with
the degree of interdependence between diﬀerent parts of the problem.
M-DPOP is designed to terminate with the outcome of the VCG mech-
anism and is made faithful by the partition principle. Agent i is not able
to prevent agents other than i from computing the correct solution to the
DCOP problem without agent i. The other agents are simply instructed
to ignore any messages that agent i sends during the process of solving the
problem without i. In addition, agents other than i are responsible for ﬁ-
nally computing the payment that agent i must make. This is achieved
by ensuring that they have enough information locally to understand the
marginal eﬀect of agent i on their own value. M-DPOP is also able to re-use
computation performed in solving the main problem when solving the prob-
lem without agent i, by carefully retaining a similar control ﬂow in solving
the problem without i and identifying which messages can be re-used.
1.5.6 Case Study: A Distributed Second Price Auction.
Consider again the earlier example of a distributed second price auction.
Recall that the intended strategy was not faithful because an agent would
choose not to propagate the values of agents further downstream from the
center.
Monderer and Tennenholtz [MT99] (MT) study a special case of this prob-
lem, with message-passing and information-revelation actions but without
computational actions. The basic function of agents is to propagate bids re-
ceived from agents further downstream on, towards the center. The appro-
priate concerns, then, are those of IC and CC but the agents are not required
to perform any computational actions as part of the intended strategy.
MT consider a biconnected graph so that a message sent by any agent i
to be delivered to the center would still be received by the center even if
one other agent deviates and chooses not to propagate the message. This is
almost suﬃcient by itself because an agent can no longer beneﬁt from drop-
ping a message. However, this would not lead to the correct implementation
because an agent that sees a bid from downstream with value greater than
its own would stop forwarding messages from that round forwards (or at
least be weakly indiﬀerent.) Agents at the far edges of the network would
be disadvantaged.
MT address this by masking the information so that an agent does not
learn anything useful when forwarding the bid of another agent. For this,60 D. C. Parkes
MT assume that values are deﬁned on a domain of size 2k for some positive
integer k, and with an agent values distributed uniformly on {1,...,2k}.
Let vi denote a bit string representation of agent i’s value, i.e. vi ∈ {0,1}k.
Before sending its value, agent i selects a bit string yi ∈ {0,1}k uniformly
at random. This acts to mask its value. The agent sends yi on one of its
outgoing edges and vi ⊕ yi (the bit-by-bit exclusive or of vi and yi) on the
other. A forwarding agent cannot distinguish the mask yi from the masked
bid vi ⊕ yi, and even if it could determine vi ⊕ yi would not learn anything
about vi because the posterior distribution on the masked bid is the same
as the prior on value.
Taken together, this brings the intended strategy of correct forwarding of
messages into an ex post Nash equilibrium. Each agent chooses to report
its vi ⊕yi and mask yi truthfully, and the center ﬁnally combines this infor-
mation, with yi ⊕ (vi ⊕ yi) = vi and recovers the values and determines the
Vickrey outcome.
1.6 Dynamic Environments: Online Mechanisms
Many multi-agent problem domains are inherently dynamic. Consider, for
instance, multi-agent planning domains [BGT03], and resource allocation
in grid computing, where jobs have state and require resources for some
period of time [FK00]. Other compelling examples are the eBay marketplace,
in which auctions open and close over time and the bidder population is
dynamic, and the sponsored search auctions used by Google and Yahoo!, in
which supply and demand is realized online. One can also think about a
group of suppliers in long-term contracts with a car manufacturer; in this
setting the private state of a supplier (and its value for diﬀerent decisions)
can change dynamically, e.g., perhaps its workers go on strike, part of its
plant fails, or the price of electricity increases.
In each of these settings at least one of the following is true: agents are
dynamically arriving or departing, or ﬁxed but with each agent realizing new
information about its local problem across time; or, there is uncertainty
about the set of feasible decisions in the future. These dynamics present
a new challenges when seeking to sustain good system-wide decisions in
multi-agent systems with self-interested agents. For example, if the agent
population is dynamically changing then simultaneous reports of type (as in
the standard model of direct-revelation mechanisms) is not possible.
The general problem of designing mechanisms for dynamic environments
considers a center that implements a sequence of decisions, and agents thatComputational Mechanism Design 61
report (perhaps untruthfully) private type information and have values that
pertain to a sequence of decisions.
The appropriate notion of direct revelation is that of a direct-revelation,
online mechanism in which the strategy space allows an agent to make a
claim about its private information in each period. For example, in the
simple case that each agent “arrives” in some period, a direct-revelation
online mechanism will allow an agent to make a claim about its valuation
function for diﬀerent decisions by sending a single message in some period.
There are two main frameworks in which to study the performance of
online mechanisms. The ﬁrst is model-free [LN00], and adopts a worst-case
analysis and is useful when a designer does not have good probabilistic infor-
mation about future agent types or about feasible decisions in future periods.
The second is model-based [FP03, PS03], and adopts an average-case analy-
sis. As a motivating example, consider a search engine selling search terms
to advertisers. This is a data rich environment and it is reasonable to believe
that the seller can build an accurate model to predict the distribution on
types of buyers, including the process governing arrival and departures.
We will consider each of these paradigms in turn. The mechanisms studied
in the ﬁrst framework will provide DSIC but require a restricted environ-
ment (single-valued). The mechanisms studied in the second framework will
provide BNIC but apply to a more general environment. See Parkes [Par07]
for a comprehensive survey.
1.6.1 Example: Dynamic Auction with Expiring Items
Consider a dynamic auction model with discrete time periods T =
{1,2,...,} and a single indivisible item to allocate in each time period. The
type of an agent i ∈ {1,...,N} is denoted θi = (ai,di,wi) ∈ T × T × R>0.
Agent i has arrival time ai, departure time di, value wi for an allocation
of a single unit of the item in some period t ∈ [ai,di], and wants at most
one unit. An agent has zero value if allocated an item outside of this pe-
riod. This information is all private to an agent. Moreover, suppose that an
agent does not know about its type until period ai and thus cannot report
an arrival time, ˆ ai, that is any earlier than this period. A payment can be
collected from an agent in any period t ∈ [ai,di], including a period after an
item is allocated [HKP04, HKMP05].
The following example illustrates why online auctions introduce new
strategic considerations into MD.
Example 1.50 Suppose there are three agents, with types θ1 =62 D. C. Parkes
(1,2,100),θ2 = (1,2,80) and θ3 = (2,2,60) and a seller that has a sin-
gle unit of an item to sell in each of periods 1 and 2. Consider an online
variant of the Vickrey auction: an agent can report its type in any period,
and its bid will be considered in each of a sequence of second-price auctions
until it wins or until its departure period, whichever occurs ﬁrst. In the ex-
ample, if the agents are truthful, then agent 1 wins in period 1 for 80, stops
bidding, and agent 2 wins in period 2 for 60. But agent 1 can do better. It
can report type ˆ θ1 = (1,2,61), so that agent 2 wins in period 1 for 61, stops
bidding, and then agent 1 wins for 60 in period 2. Or, agent 1 can report
type ˆ θ1 = (2,2,80) and delay its bid until period 2, so that agent 2 wins for
0 in period 1, stops bidding, and then agent 1 wins for 60 in period 2.
In this context, a direct-revelation online mechanism, M =< g,p >, has
an outcome rule g : Θ → K and payment rule p : Θ → Rn. Each agent can
send a message in a single period, to make a claim about its type. We adopt
notation K for the space of alternatives, instead of A, to avoid confusion
with the arrival time, ai.
Outcome k ∈ K deﬁnes a sequence of allocations k1,...,kt,... for t ∈ T
where (in this environment) kt ⊆ N deﬁnes the winner(s) in period t. The
outcome rule and payment rule must be online implementable, deﬁned as
follows: Let g(θ,t) = k[1..t] ,i.e. the sequence of decisions made between
periods 1 and t. Then, we must have g(θ,t) = z and g(ˆ θ,t) = ˆ z  = z implies
that ˆ θi = (ˆ ai, ˆ di, ˆ wi)  = θi for some agent i with ˆ ai ≤ t. Similarly, for the
payment rule, we need pi(θ) = π and pi(ˆ θ) = ˆ π  = π implies that ˆ θi  = θi
or ˆ θj = (ˆ aj, ˆ dj, ˆ wj)  = θj for some j  = i with ˆ aj ≤ di.38 We also write
gi(θ) ∈ {0,1} to denote whether or not agent i is allocated an item in some
period t ∈ [ai,di] by outcome rule g.
A Characterization of Truthful Auctions An online mechanism is
DSIC (or truthful) if an agent’s dominant strategy is to report its true type,
whatever the future reports of other agents. For this setting in which type
information is simple, with an arrival, departure and value for an allocation
decision, we can deﬁne an appropriate form of monotonicity:
Deﬁnition 1.51 [HKMP05] Outcome rule g : Θ → {0,1}n is monotonic
if for every agent i and every θ,θ′ ∈ Θ with [a′
i,d′
i] ⊆ [ai,di], wi > w′
i, and
θ−i = θ′
−i, we have gi(θ) > gi(θ′).
38By this deﬁnition, if a payment rule is online implementable then it will also have a ﬁxed
payment to agent i for all periods t after the reported departure of the agent, and thus satisﬁes
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In words, if an agent wins for some report (ai,di,wi) then it should con-
tinue to win for a more relaxed arrival-departure interval, and a higher value.
Given an outcome rule, we can deﬁne the critical value to agent i for
arrival and departure (ai,d):
vc
(ai,di)(θ−i) =
 
minw′
i s.t. gi((ai,di,w′
i),θ−i) = 1
∞, if no such w′
i exists
(1.35)
When the outcome rule is monotonic, the critical value to agent i is
independent of value wi and (weakly) monotonically increasing in tighter
arrival-departure intervals. In this domain, any truthful (and determinis-
tic) online mechanism that satisﬁes IR must collect a payment equal to the
critical value from each allocated agent. Monotonicity is also necessary; any
truthful online mechanism that does not pay unallocated agents must be
monotonic [HKMP05, Par07].
For simplicity we will now make an additional assumption, that of no
late-departure misreports. Together with no late-arrival misreports, we have
that agent reports ai ≤ ˆ ai ≤ ˆ di ≤ di. For example, if this is an auction for
theater tickets, then we could argue that it is not credible to claim to have
value for a ticket for a last minute Broadway show after 5pm because the
auctioneer knows that it takes at least 2 hours to get to the theater and the
show starts at 7pm. For network resources, such as an auction for access
to WiFi bandwidth in a coﬀee house, think about requiring a user to be
present for the entire period of time reported to the mechanism.39
We have the following positive result in this environment:
Theorem 1.52 [HKMP05] Online mechanism < g,p > is truthful with
agents that arrive, depart and have a value for a single unit of an item,
when g is monotonic and p collects the critical-value payment from winners,
and given no early-arrival and no late-departure misreports.
The intuition for this result is that an agent cannot do any better by
reporting a tighter arrival-departure interval because this will only make it
less likely that it will be allocated, and increase its payment. Moreover,
its payment (for a given arrival-departure) and contingent on winning is
independent of its bid value and if the agent loses when bidding its true
39The assumption of no late-departures can be dispensed with, while still retaining truthfulness,
in environments in which it is possible to schedule a resource in some period before an agent’s
reported departure, but withhold access to the beneﬁt from the use of the resource until the
reported departure; e.g., in grid computing, jobs can run on the machine but the result then held
until reported departure [Por04].64 D. C. Parkes
value then even though it might win by increasing its bid, its critical value
payment will be greater than its value. For a proof, see Parkes [Par07].40
Model-Free Analysis. In this setting we will adopt a model-free frame-
work, and not assume any particular distributional information about the
environment. The performance of a mechanism can instead by studied via
a worst-case analysis, for a sequence of types that are generated by an “ad-
versary” whose task it is to make the performance as bad as possible. Of
particular relevance is the method of competitive analysis, typically adopted
in the study of online algorithms. The following question is asked: how ef-
fectively does the performance of the online mechanism “compete” with that
of an oﬄine mechanism that is given complete information about the future
arrival of agent types? Again, this is asked in the worst-case, for a suitably
adversarially-deﬁned input.
Competitive analysis is most easily justiﬁed when the designer does not
have a good model of the environment. As a motivating example, consider
selling a completely new product or service, for which it is not possible to
conduct market research to get a good model of demand. Competitive anal-
ysis can also lead to mechanisms that enjoy good average-case performance
in practice, provide insight into how to design robust mechanisms, and pro-
duce useful “lower-bound” analysis. A lower-bound for a problem makes a
statement about the best possible performance that can be achieved by any
mechanism. Online mechanisms are of special interest when their realized
performance matches the lower bound.
For our adversarial model, we consider a powerful adversary that is able
to pick arbitrary agent types, including the value, arrival and departure of
agents. Let z ∈ Z denote the set of inputs available to the adversary and
θz the corresponding type proﬁle. An online mechanism is c-competitive for
eﬃciency if:
min
z∈Z
E
 
Val(g(θz))
V ∗(θz)
 
≥
1
c
, (1.36)
for some constant c ≥ 1. Here Val(g(θz)) is the total value of the alloca-
tion determined by outcome rule g and V ∗(θz) is the best possible solution,
determined with perfect information about all of the types. Such a mecha-
nism is guaranteed to achieve within fraction 1
c of the value of the optimal
40The suﬃciency result can also be generalized to a domain with arbitrary misreports of departure,
by placing a timing constraint on the allocation [HKMP05]. It can also be extended to a more
general valuation domain, in which agents have single-valued types, with the same value for any
of some interesting set of decisions [Par07, PD07].Computational Mechanism Design 65
oﬄine algorithm, whatever the input sequence. The expectation allows for
a randomized outcome rule.
Back to the Expiring Items Setting Consider the following auction,
proposed in Hajiaghayi et al. [HKMP05] (HKMP):
(i) In each period, t, allocate the good to the highest unassigned bid.
(ii) Agent i pays the critical value, which is the smallest amount that it
could have bid and still won an item.
For impatient bidders with di = ai for all θi, this is precisely a sequence
of Vickrey auctions and truthful in a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Theorem 1.53 [HKMP05] The HKMP online auction is 2-competitive for
eﬃciency and truthful in the expiring items environment and with no early-
arrival and no late-departure misreports.
Proof Suppose that random tie-breaking is invariant to reported arrival and
departure. The auction is strongly truthful because the allocation function
is monotone: if agent i wins in some period t ∈ [ai,di] then it continues
to win either earlier or in the same period for w′
i > wi, and for a′
i < ai or
d′
i > di. For competitiveness, consider a set of types θ and establish that
the greedy online allocation rule is 2-competitive by a “charging argument”.
For any agent i that is allocated oﬄine but not online, charge its value to
the online agent that was allocated in period t in which agent i is allocated
oﬄine. Since agent i is not allocated online it is present in period t, and the
greedy rule allocates to another agent in that period with at least as much
value as agent i. For any agent i that is allocated oﬄine and also online,
charge its value to itself in the online solution. Each agent that is allocated
in the online solution is charged at most twice, and in all cases for a value
less than or equal to its own value. Therefore the optimal oﬄine value V ∗(θ)
is at most twice the value of the greedy solution.
There is actually a 1.618-competitive online algorithm for this problem
but it is not monotonic and cannot be implemented truthfully. In fact,
there is a matching lower bound for the problem of achieving eﬃciency and
truthfulness:
Theorem 1.54 No truthful, IR and deterministic online mechanism can
obtain a (2 − ǫ)-approximation for eﬃciency in the expiring items environ-
ment with no early-arrival and no late-departure misreports, for any constant
ǫ > 0.66 D. C. Parkes
For the proof of this result see Hajiaghayi et al. [HKMP05]. More than just
this gap, between what is possible with and without incentive constraints,
Lavi and Nisan [LN05] also show that no constant-competitive mechanism is
possible in this environment without the assumption of no-late-departures.
Thus, we have another justiﬁcation for this assumption.
Example 1.55 Consider the earlier example, with three agents and types
θ1 = (1,2,100),θ2 = (1,2,80) and θ3 = (2,2,60) and one item to sell in each
period. Suppose all three agents bid truthfully. The greedy allocation rule
sells to agent 1 in period 1 and then agent 2 in period 2. Agent 1’s payment
is 60 because this is the critical value for arrival-departure (1,2) given the
bids of other agents. (A bid of just above 60 would allow the agent to win,
albeit in period 2 instead of period 1.) Agent 2’s payment is also 60.
Example 1.56 In order to understand the distinction between DSIC and
ex post Nash IC, suppose that the reports received by the mechanism are
public. Now, agent 3 can condition its strategy on the report of agent 1.
For instance, if agent 3’s strategy is “bid (2,2,1000) if a bid of (1,2,100) is
received, and bid (2,2,60) otherwise” then agent 1 would pay 80 if truthful
but 60 with a bid of (2,2,65).
Related work considers an environment in which there is a ﬁxed num-
ber of non-expiring items to allocate before some deadline [LN00, HKP04].
Awerbuch et al. [AAM03] provide a method to convert a competitive on-
line algorithm into a truthful and competitive online auction for algorithms
that satisfy technical conditions that provide increasing prices. Bredin and
Parkes [BP05] study the environment of online double auctions in which
there are both buyers and sellers. Juda and Parkes [JP06] study a model
related to eBay, and extend the framework to allow for sequential auctions
with non-identical goods and buyers with general valuations.
1.6.2 General Environments: BNIC
In a general, dynamic valuation environment we allow agents with general
valuation functions deﬁned on sequences of decisions. To keep things simple,
we will assume here that the arrival period, ai, still models the period in
which an agent learns its own type.41
An agent’s type, θi, deﬁnes its value vi(k;θi) for a sequence k1,k2,...,kt
41Even more generally, we can also consider agents (possibly persistent) that receive information
that pertains to their own type over time [BV06, CPS06]. We make a brief comment about this
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of decisions k ∈ K in each of T discrete time periods. An agent has both an
arrival ai and a departure di, and vi(k;θi)  = vi(k′;θi) implies that kt  = k′t
for some t ∈ [ai,di].
A Markov decision process (MDP) provides a useful formalism for deﬁning
online mechanisms in model-based environments with general agent prefer-
ences [PS03]. We deﬁne an MDP model (H,K,Prob,R) with the following
components:
• State, ht = (θ1,...,θt;k1,...,kt−1), in period t ∈ T, is deﬁned in terms
of the reports that the mechanism has received up to and including this
period, and the sequence of decisions it has made. Let H denote the set
of states, and K(h) denote the set of feasible decisions in each state with
K = ∪h∈HK(h).
• Prob(ht+1|ht,kt) deﬁnes the probability of transition to state ht+1 given
decision kt in state ht. A well-deﬁned model requires
 
h′ Prob(h′|ht,kt) =
1 for all ht,kt. This transition models encapsulates both the stochastic
arrival model of agents and the eﬀect (deterministic or otherwise) of a
decision on the state.
• R(ht,kt) =
 
i∈I(ht) Ri(ht,kt), is the reward received by the policy for
taking action kt in state ht. Here, I(ht) denotes the set of agents present
in state ht, and agent i has value Ri(ht,kt) = vi(k[1..t];θi)−vi(k[1..t−1];θi),
given type θi.42
The Markov property requires that feasible decisions, transitions and
rewards depend on previous states and actions only through the cur-
rent state. It is achieved here, for example, by deﬁning ht ∈ Ht =
(θ1,...,θt;ω1,...,ωt;k1,...,kt−1), so that the state captures the complete
history of types, stochastic events, and decisions. In practice a short sum-
marization of state ht is often suﬃcient to retain the Markov property.
An optimal policy π∗ : Ht → Kt maximizes the MDP value V π(ht) =
Eπ
 
R(ht,π(ht)) + R(ht+1,π(ht+1)) + ... + R(hT,π(hT))
 
in all states ht.43
The expectation here is taken with respect to the probabilistic transition
model. The optimal MDP value function, V ∗, which corresponds to the
MDP value for the optimal policy, can be computed via the following value
42The reward to agent i in period t is deﬁned this way so that the cumulative component of
reward Ri because of the presence of agent i with type θi, is
Pτ
t=1 Ri(ht,kt) = vi(k[1..τ];θi),
for all periods τ; thus, Ri(ht,kt) deﬁnes the total value obtained by agent i up to and including
period t.
43For inﬁnite time horizons, a standard approach is to deﬁne a discount factor and maximize the
expected discounted value of a policy.68 D. C. Parkes
iteration algorithm [Put94]: for time periods t = T−1,T−2,...,1:
∀h ∈ Ht V ∗(h) = max
k∈Kt(h)
[R(h,k) +
 
h′∈Ht+1
Prob(h′|h,k)V ∗(h′)], (1.37)
where V ∗(h ∈ Ht) = maxk∈Kt(h) R(h,k). This algorithm works backwards
in time from the horizon and has time complexity polynomial in the size of
the MDP and the time horizon T.
Given the optimal MDP value function, the optimal policy is derived as
follows: for t < T, we have:
π∗(h ∈ Ht) = arg max
k∈Kt(h)
[R(h,k) +
 
h′∈Ht+1
Prob(h′|h,k)V ∗(h′)], (1.38)
and π∗(h ∈ Ht) = argmaxk∈Kt(h) R(h,k).
What makes this a problem of mechanism design is because the MDP state
is deﬁned in terms of agent type information, which is private to agents.
Thus, incentives must be provided for agents to report their private types
to the center.
A direct-revelation online mechanism, M =< π,p >, in this general set-
ting, restricts each agent to making a single claim about its type, and deﬁnes
decision policy π = {πt}t∈T and payment policy, p = {pt}t∈T, where decision
πt(ht) ∈ K(ht) is made in state ht and payment pt
i(ht) ∈ R is collected from
each agent i ∈ I(ht).
We deﬁne a dynamic VCG mechanism for this problem. We assume that
the decisions and reports in previous periods t′ < t are all public in pe-
riod t, although similar analysis holds without this. The center knows the
probabilistic transition model (and this model is also common knowledge to
agents) but the realization of types is private to agents.
Deﬁnition 1.57 [PS03] A dynamic VCG mechanism works for the ﬁnite
time horizon online MD environment works as follows:
(i) Each agent, i, reports its type ˆ θi in some period ˆ ai ≥ ai.
(ii) Implement optimal policy π∗, which maximizes the total expected
value, assuming the current state as deﬁned by agent reports is the
true state.
(iii) On reported departure, t = ˆ di, collect payment
pt
i(ht) = vi(π∗(θ[1..t]);θi) −
 
V ∗(hˆ ai) − V ∗(h
ˆ ai
−i)
 
, (1.39)
where π∗(θ[1..t]) denotes the sequence of decisions made up to andComputational Mechanism Design 69
including period t based on types θ[1..t], and ht
−i deﬁnes the (counter-
factual) MDP state constructed to be equal to ht but removing agent
i’s type from the state. The payment is zero otherwise.
Agent i’s payment is its (ex post) value discounted by the value (V ∗(hˆ ai)−
V ∗(h
ˆ ai
−i)), which is the expected marginal value it contributes to the system
as estimated upon its arrival and based on its report. With this, the expected
utility to agent i when reporting truthfully is equal to the expected marginal
value that it contributes to the multi-agent system through its presence.
For incentive-compatibility, we need the technical property of stalling,
which requires that the expected value of policy π∗ cannot be improved (in
expectation) by delaying the report of an agent.44 In addition, we assume
an independence property; namely, the probabilistic process deﬁning the
arrival of agents other than i is independent of whether or not agent i has
arrived.
Theorem 1.58 [PS03] The dynamic VCG mechanism, coupled with a pol-
icy that satisﬁes stalling, is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible (BNIC) and
implements the expected-value maximizing policy, in a domain with no early-
arrival misreports but arbitrary misreports of departure.
To understand why the dynamic VCG mechanism is BNIC, consider the
following expression, which is the expected utility (deﬁned with respect to
its information in period ai) to agent i for report ˆ θi, and given that agents
other than i are truthful. Let c ≥ 0 denote the number of periods by which
agent i misreports its arrival time. The expected utility is:
Eπ∗
 
vi(π∗(hai);θi)|ˆ θi
 
+Eπ∗
  T  
t=ai+c
R−i(ht,π∗(ht))
 
−Eπ∗
 
V ∗(h
ai+c
−i )
 
(A) (B) (C)
Here, Eπ
 
vi(π(h);θi)
 
denotes the expected value to agent i with type θi
for policy π executed from state h forward in time, and R−i(ht,kt) is the
total value to all agents except i for decision kt in state ht.
Term (A) denotes the expected value to agent i given its misreport. Term
(B) is the expected value to all other agents forward from reported arrival,
ai+c, given report ˆ θi and optimal policy π∗. It corresponds to the expected
value of terms {−vi(π∗(θ[1..ˆ di]);θi) + V ∗(hˆ ai)} in the payment. Term (A) +
(B) is the expected value to all other agents, plus the expected true value
to agent i given its misreport. Term (C) is the total expected value to other
44This stalling property is typically reasonable, for example any optimal policy that is able to
delay for itself any decisions that pertain to the value of an agent will automatically satisfy stalling.70 D. C. Parkes
agents forward from period ai+c, but with agent i removed, and corresponds
to the ﬁnal term in the payment.
First, ﬁx the reported arrival period. Now term (C) is agent-independent,
as in the oﬄine VCG mechanism, and agent i maximizes the sum of (A)
+ (B) in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium by reporting its true valuation function
vi(k;θi) because the policy π∗ is deﬁned so that it will maximize these terms
when the agent reports its true type.
But, agent i can also delay its reported arrival, which can aﬀect the value
of term (C) in addition to terms (A) + (B). This is a new manipulation,
not possible to an agent in the oﬄine VCG but possible here because an
agent can change the set of agents other than itself with which its marginal
negative eﬀect is judged by delaying its arrival. However, BNIC is retained
because in equilibrium the expected decrease in (C) caused by delay c to
agent i’s arrival is equal to the expected decrease in (B), and these two eﬀects
cancel out. Thus, an agent can report its true arrival time, and contingent
on this we have established that an agent should report its true type.
To understand this, add term Eπ∗
  ai+c−1  
t=ai
R−i(ht,π∗(ht))
 
to term (B)
and subtract it again from term (C). The adjusted term (C’) is now agent
independent (by the independence property) and can be ignored for the
purpose of establishing BNIC. Term (A) combined with adjusted term (B’)
is the expected value to all other agents forward from period ai, plus the
expected true value to agent i. Agent i’s best response is to report its true
type (and immediately upon arrival) because the policy π∗ is deﬁned to
maximize (A)+(B’) when the other agents are truthful, i.e. in a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium.
Remarks
The dynamic VCG mechanism is BNIC but not dominant strategy IC. This
is a diﬀerent solution concept than in an oﬄine VCG mechanism. We only
have BNIC because the correctness of the policy depends on the center
having the correct model for the distribution on agent types. Without the
correct model the policy is not optimal in expectation and an agent with
beliefs diﬀerent from that of the center should deviate to improve (its belief
about) the expected utility it will receive. The center can only have correct
beliefs in equilibrium.
In addition to expected-value maximizing, the dynamic VCG mechanism
is ex post IR if the environment satisﬁes agent-monotonicity, which requires
that introducing an agent to a state always has a positive expected eﬀect
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where there are eﬀects such as congestion, for instance physical domains
where the arrival of an additional robot may block the movements of other
robots.
The dynamic VCG mechanism also satisﬁes ex ante WBB if the environ-
ment satisﬁes no positive externalities, which requires that the arrival of an
agent does not have a positive expected eﬀect on the total value of the other
agents.This holds when agents are all consumers, but not when some agents
contribute value to a team by their presence (e.g. sellers in a market, or
robots bringing a new skill that enables a task that all robots care about to
be completed more quickly).
Parkes et al. [PSY04] construct an ǫ-BNIC online mechanism by cou-
pling the dynamic VCG mechanism with an approximate, sparse-sampling
algorithm to compute the online decision in each period [KMN99]. The algo-
rithm is a good ﬁt with the requirements of the dynamic VCG mechanism
because the payments just require an estimate of the system value with
agent i and without agent i upon its arrival, and sparse-sampling can be
used to get such an estimate. The approximate, dynamic VCG mechanism
is ǫ-BNIC, in the sense that no agent can gain more than some amount ǫ > 0
(that can be made arbitrarily small) by deviating from truthful reporting,
as long as the other agents are truthful. This example illustrates making a
tradeoﬀ between an exact equilibrium solution concept and computational
tractability.
The dynamic VCG mechanism has been further generalized by Bergemann
and V¨ al¨ amaki [BV06], whose work along with that of Cavallo et al. [CPS06]
applies to a model in which agent state changes across time. Because of
this, incentive compatibility must now be assured in every period, so that
an agent will continue to report its true state information. For an applica-
tion, consider a multi-agent variation on the classical multi-armed bandits
problem. Each agent owns an “arm” and receives a reward when its arm is
activated, sampled from a stationary distribution. The reward signals are
privately observed and allow an agent to update its model for the reward on
its arm. In a setting with an inﬁnite time horizon and discounting, one can
use Gittins’ [GJ74] celebrated index policy to characterize an eﬃcient online
policy that makes the optimal tradeoﬀ between exploitation and exploration.
In the presence of self-interest, the generalized (dynamic) VCG mechanism
provides incentives to support truthful reporting of reward signals by each
agent, and thus implement the eﬃcient learning policy.72 D. C. Parkes
1.7 Conclusions
Mechanism design provides a beautiful but theory for how to perform opti-
mization in multi-agent systems with self-interest and distributed, privately
known information. However, mechanism design must be extended in many
dimensions to make it widely applicable to distributed intelligent systems.
This is natural because mechanisms are being realized, and in realizing them
new considerations– e.g. those of computational and communication eﬃ-
ciency –come to light. Progress on this agenda, in the emerging subﬁeld
of computational mechanism design, requires a strong background in the
techniques of computer science, microeconomics, and operations research.
In these notes we have considered three main topics: algorithmic mech-
anism design and its focus on the computational complexity of central-
ized problem solving in MD; indirect mechanisms and the problem of eﬃ-
cient preference elicitation in CMD; distributed implementation, distributed
AMD, and the problems entailed in getting agents involved in computing
the outcome of mechanisms; and online MD in which mechanism design is
applied to dynamic environments.
To date, CMD has relied heavily on dominant-strategy implementation,
and to a lesser extent ex post Nash implementation. Yet, it seems likely that
an important future direction is to develop new solution concepts. There
is mounting evidence of the diﬃculties in implementing desirable outcomes
with these strong solution concepts. Moreover, agents (both computational
and human) are intrinsically bounded in their capacity for deliberation and
modeling. One challenge, going forward is to ﬁnd analytically tractable
models of bounded-rationality; we need models that support the design of
new mechanisms.45
Much current work in CMD focuses on worst-case approximation results
and polynomial-time algorithms. This attention to the worst-case is some-
what at odds with the traditions in artiﬁcial intelligence and operations
research of heuristic, anytime algorithms such as tree search for solving op-
timization problems. Algorithms such as these are designed to work well
on typical problem instances and fail gracefully. We should expect future
work to ﬁnd methods to integrate the search and sample-based methods
of AI and OR into the methods of CMD, retaining appropriate incentive
properties [PS04a, PD07, e.g.].
Research in CMD will also need to acknowledge, and then systemati-
cally attack, the obvious limitations in the equilibrium concepts and models
45Some work has started in this direction [LS01, LS04a, LN05, HB04, HB06, HB07, BW05, Par04].
We also note that economics is increasingly welcoming of behavioral models of agent behav-
ior [LG04, Mul02, Rab98, Wil04].Computational Mechanism Design 73
adopted in current work. Most glaring of these is the almost exclusive con-
sideration of unilateral deviation. With limited exception [GH05, e.g.], no
attention has been given to the possibilities of collusive behavior or other
coordinated manipulations. Another example of a largely unmodeled ma-
nipulation is that of false-name bidding [Yok03, YSM04]. Other weaknesses
of current models include the private values assumption [IP06, e.g.] and
the quasilinear utility assumption [BCI+05, e.g.]. Finally, there are many
computational domains in which it is impossible to support payments, but
there has been comparatively less focus on implementation in settings with
ordinal preferences [CSL07].
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